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Using data from Eurobarometer Surveys 2001–2011 we examine trends and correlates of childlessness intentions and ideals across Europe over the past decade. We distinguish childlessness as a personal preference (personal ideal number of children is zero) from intended childlessness (intention to have no children) as these reflect somewhat different dimensions of childlessness as a conscious decision. We find that, on average, childlessness as a personal preference is relatively rare in Europe, although in some western European countries a sizeable proportion of young adults express a desire to have no children. Intentional childlessness is slightly more common than ideal childlessness is, since about 11% of currently childless young adults aged 18 to 40 years in Europe intend to have no children. We analyse factors related to childlessness intentions and ideals on the individual and country levels. A weaker individual socioeconomic position influences the intention to remain childless through various channels, such as unemployment or low socioeconomic status. Associations between individual’s social position and ideal childlessness are less clear. Results also indicate that macro-economic conditions do not have a direct impact on intentional childlessness, whereas a higher prevalence of traditional family values in a country is related to a lower likelihood of individuals considering childlessness to be their ideal family form.

BackgroundThe pursuit of sexual pleasure is a key motivating factor in sexual activity. Many things can stand in the way of sexual orgasms and enjoyment, particularly among women. These are essential issues of sexual well-being and gender equality.ObjectiveThis study presents long-term trends and determinants of female orgasms in Finland. The aim is to analyze the roles of factors such as the personal importance of orgasms, sexual desire, masturbation, clitoral and vaginal stimulation, sexual self-esteem, communication with partner, and partner’s sexual techniques.DesignIn Finland, five national sex surveys that are based on random samples from the central population register have been conducted. They are representative of the total population within the age range of 18–54 years in 1971 (N=2,152), 18–74 years in 1992 (N=2,250), 18–81 years in 1999 (N=1,496), 18–74 years in 2007 (N=2,590), and 18–79 years in 2015 (N=2,150). Another dataset of 2,049 women in the age group of 18–70 years was collected in 2015 via a national Internet panel.ResultsContrary to expectations, women did not have orgasms that are more frequent by increasing their experience and practice of masturbation, or by experimenting with different partners in their lifetime. The keys to their more frequent orgasms lay in mental and relationship factors. These factors and capacities included orgasm importance, sexual desire, sexual self-esteem, and openness of sexual communication with partners. Women valued their partner’s orgasm more than their own. In addition, positive determinants were the ability to concentrate, mutual sexual initiations, and partner’s good sexual techniques. A relationship that felt good and worked well emotionally, and where sex was approached openly and appreciatively, promoted orgasms.ConclusionThe findings indicate that women differ greatly from one another in terms of their tendency and capacity to experience orgasms. The improvements in gender equality and sexual education since the 1970s have not helped women to become more orgasmic. Neither has the major increase in masturbation habits (among women in general). One challenge for future studies is to understand why women value their partner’s orgasms more than their own.

"-Well, life didn't turn out as expected."Recently, I (the first author of this chapter) attended a school reunion where I caught up with former classmates, many of whom I had not seen for decades. When I spoke to one of the attendees, I was intrigued by her frank answer, quoted above, to my general question about how she was doing. Finns have preserved the touching habit of taking small talk seriously. So I asked her what she meant. "-For a start, I have no children."Since my former classmates are now approaching 50, it was clear that the childbearing years were over for the women in the room. Most of the people gathered had a couple of teenagers at home, while some had older children who had already moved out. Some of the men had paired up with younger women and had toddlers. As so often in such social situations, how the children are doing emerged as the easiest, safest discussion topic in the noisy room. Even if the children have problems, they can be shared anecdotally, or glossed over by a superficial answer.The topic of childlessness is much more sensitive. Finns are liberal and secular in their attitudes towards family life. As early as in the 1980s, over 70 % of Finnish women surveyed said they did not believe that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled (Nikander 1992), and only 20 % said they thought that a person could not be completely happy unless he or she has children (Paajanen et al. 2007). Although there is no strong stigma associated with childlessness in Finland, it is still not easy to ask people why they are childless, in part because the reasons they might

Most research on trends in socio-economic fertility differences has focused on cohort total fertility and on women. This study aimed to analyse how cohort trends in parity-specific fertility differ across educational segments for men and women and what role multi-partner fertility plays in these trends. We used Finnish and Swedish register data on cohorts born in 1940-73/78. The main analyses used parity progression ratios, comparing ordinary ratios with similar ratios using births to first reproductive partners only. Among the low and medium educated, we observe strengthening parity polarization across cohorts, with increases in both childlessness and births of order three or higher, the latter largely reflecting increases in multi-partner fertility. Highly educated men and women more often have exactly two children. We demonstrate that cohort total fertility can mask significant parity-specific trends across educational groups and that changes in multi-partner fertility can play a part in cohort trends in socio-economic fertility differentials.