What are paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural (PSMS) beliefs and what, if anything, separates them? Currently, use of the concepts is ambiguous and agreement is weak. A literature search for articles dealing with PSMS beliefs during the last two decades produced conceptual definitions that we grouped into seven groups. Five groups consisted of definitions that were domain-general, namely false beliefs, belief in scientifically impossible phenomena, and associative biases (covariation bias, laws of sympathetic magic, and irrational acts). Two sets of definitions were domain-specific (content-dependent), namely counterintuitive and intuitive beliefs about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena. Empirical methods were reviewed to show what kinds of beliefs have been examined under the rubrics paranormal, supernatural, magical, or superstitious. We concluded that the concepts paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural denote the same thing and that domain-general definitions are inadequately precise. Defining PSMS beliefs as category mistakes that confuse the distinctive attributes of mental phenomena, material objects, living, and animate organisms, and the processes these engage in, fared best in distinguishing PSMS beliefs from other beliefs and covering relevant beliefs. We suggest researchers sharpen the content of the measures and strive to integrate lines of research that have so far remained separate.

Intuitive thinking is known to predict paranormal beliefs, but the processes underlying this relationship, and the role of other thinking dispositions, have remained unclear. Study 1 showed that while an intuitive style increased and a reflective disposition counteracted paranormal beliefs, the ontological confusions suggested to underlie paranormal beliefs were predicted by individual differences in involuntary inhibitory processes. When the reasoning system was subjected to cognitive load, the ontological confusions increased, lost their relationship with paranormal beliefs, and their relationship with weaker inhibition was strongly accentuated. These findings support the argument that the confusions are mainly intuitive and that they therefore are most discernible under conditions in which inhibition is impaired, that is, when thinking is dominated by intuitive processing. Study 2 replicated the findings on intuitive and reflective thinking and paranormal beliefs. In Study 2, ontological confusions were also related to the same thinking styles as paranormal beliefs. The results support a model in which both intuitive and non-reflective thinking styles and involuntary inhibitory processes give way to embracing culturally acquired paranormal beliefs.

We examined with functional magnetic resonance imaging the brain activity of 12 supernatural believers and 11 skeptics who first imagined themselves in critical life situations (e.g. problems in intimate relationships) and then watched emotionally charged pictures of lifeless objects and scenery (e.g. two red cherries bound together). Supernatural believers reported seeing signs of how the situations were going to turn out in the pictures more often than skeptics did. Viewing the pictures activated the same brain regions among all participants (e.g. the left inferior frontal gyrus, IFG). However, the right IFG, previously associated with cognitive inhibition, was activated more strongly in skeptics than in supernatural believers, and its activation was negatively correlated to sign seeing in both participant groups. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on the universal processes that may underlie supernatural beliefs and the role of cognitive inhibition in explaining individual differences in such beliefs.

What is the cognitive basis for the common belief that random events have a purpose, and are these beliefs a form of supernatural thinking, as Bering has suggested? Two questionnaire studies with Finnish volunteer participants (N ¼ 2650, 1830 females, mean age 26) used structural equation modelling (SEM) to test the hypotheses that beliefs in the purpose of events are part of the same phenomenon as paranormal beliefs and that confusions of core knowledge of the psychological, biological and physical domains predict both sets of beliefs. In Study 1, participants were not given a definition of purpose, and in Study 2, purpose was explicitly defined as entailing planning by a supernatural agent. The results from both studies supported the predictions. The results indicate that construing events in terms of purpose is not a universal tendency but an individual cognitive bias that can be accounted for by false analogies from intuitive psychology, biology and physics.