This paper provides an economic analysis of recent vertical and horizontal mergers in the U.S. industry for audiovisual media content, including the AT&T-Time Warner and the Disney-Fox mergers. Using a theory-driven approach, we examine economic effects of these types of mergers on market competition, focusing on digital media content distribution. In doing so, we address three research questions: (i) Is the current development of analyzing industry with its recent merger activity concerning? (ii) Would vertical or horizontal integration be more preferable for overall welfare and competition in this industry? (iii) What are implications for antitrust policy? We conclude from our analysis that in the already highly horizontally concentrated U.S. market for audiovisual content the process of further vertical integration creates concerns from a competition policy perspective. Moreover, even though horizontal concentration on some of the market stages may be anticompetitive as well, vertical integration is likely to be more harmful. As a consequence, we recommend a stricter approach to vertical merger control in this industry, as well as a more active abuse control against already vertically-integrated media companies.

The ubiquitous process of digitization changes economic competition on markets in several ways and leads to the emergence of new business models. The increasing roles of digital platforms as well as data-driven markets represent two relevant examples. These developments challenge competition policy, which must consider the special economic characteristics of digital goods and markets. In Germany, national competition law was amended in 2017 in order to accommodate for digitization-driven changes in the economy and plans for further changes are already discussed. We review this institutional change from an economics perspective and argue that most of the reform's elements point into the right direction. However, some upcoming challenges may have been overlooked so far. Furthermore, we discuss whether European competition policy should follow the paragon of the German reform and amend its institutional framework accordingly. We find scope for reform particularly regarding data-driven markets, whereas platform economics appear to be already well-established.

Zusammenfassung: Das Instrument der Ministererlaubnis ist ein vieldiskutierter Sonderfall in der deutschen Wettbewerbspolitik, bei welchem der Bundeswirtschaftsminister einen vom Bundeskartellamt (BKartA) untersagten Zusammenschluss bei Vorliegen besonderer Gründe im Nachhinein doch noch erlauben kann. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden sowohl die Ausgestaltung, als auch die Sinnhaftigkeit des Instrumentes an sich aus ökonomischer Sicht beleuchtet, indem zunächst die im Gesetz verankerten Gründe für eine Erlaubnis auf einen Konflikt mit dem Schutz des Wettbewerbs, als übergeordnete Aufgabe des BKartA, untersucht werden. Nach einer Analyse der bisherigen 22 Fälle, bezogen auf die jeweiligen Begründungen und Erfolge, werden abschließend fünf Möglichkeiten zur Novellierung des Instrumentes diskutiert. Dabei kommen die Autoren zu dem Schluss, dass eine Anpassung des Gesetzes, sowohl bezogen auf das entscheidende Gremium, als auch bezüglich der zulässigen Begründungen für eine Ministererlaubnis, notwendig wäre, um das Bestehen des Instrumentes wohlfahrtsökonomisch rechtfertigen zu können.

Nowadays, merger control predominantly relies upon a strict analysis of the effects from merger and acquisitions on effective competition. However, there is scope for so-called public interest considerations in several European merger control regimes and recently a number of European politicians have called for more elbowroom for non-competition-oriented interventions into merger control. For instance, they did so in the context of the prohibition of the Siemens-Alstommerger and the upcoming industrial policy discussion about European Champions.

The ministerial proposal for a 10 th amendment of the German competition law particularly addresses abuse control and seeks to tighten this pillar of competition policy against the background of the challenges from the digital economy. Next to extending the classic policy instruments of abuse control, the reform proposal suggests to introduce an additional and novel type of market power: the outstanding relevance across markets (ORAM). From an economic perspective, such an institution is interesting as it emphasizes non-horizontal and less direct anticompetitive abuses of market power. We review what type of cases could be subject to such a concept of systemic market power. Furthermore, we address the question whether merger control could also benefit from an ORAM-style conception.