This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.

What are the implications of major customer dependency, i.e., the degree of a supplier firm's dependency on its major customers, for external auditors? While the conventional view emphasizes the negatives of major customer dependency for client business risk, we find that suppliers with more concentrated customer bases spend less on audit fees. The evidence is consistent with reduced audit effort due to efficiency gains in the audit process, especially when suppliers with more concentrated customer bases share the same auditors with their long-standing major customers. The audit fee discount we identify does not imply that audit quality declines with customer-base concentration. In fact, we find that suppliers with more concentrated customer bases are less likely to experience material restatements of previously audited financial statements. Taking the external auditors' perspective, our study provides new managerial insights on the costs and benefits of major customer relationships for supplier firms. Data Availability: All data are available from sources identified in the text.

A firm in a steady state generates predictable income and investors can generally agree on its valuation. However, when a significant corporate event occurs this creates greater uncertainty and disagreement about firm valuation, and investors could prefer to avoid holding such a stock. We examine research that has developed financial ratio models to: (a) predict significant corporate events; and (b) predict future performance after significant corporate events. The events we analyze include financial distress and bankruptcy, downsizing, raising equity capital, and material earnings misstatements. We find that financial ratio models generally help investors avoid stocks that are likely to have significant corporate events. We also find that, conditional on a significant event occurring, financial ratio models help investors distinguish good firms from bad. However, we find that research design choices often make it difficult to determine model predictive accuracy. We discuss the role of accounting rule changes and their impact over time on the predictive power of models, and provide suggestions for improving models based on our cross-event analysis.

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