The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author( s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit conunents and to :further debate.This paper explores the relationship between the degree of division or fractionalization of a country's population (along ethnolinguistic and religious dimensions) and both political instability and government consumption, using a neoclassical growth model. The principal idea is that greater fractionalization, proxying for the degree of conflict in society, leads to political instability, which in turn leads to higher government consumption aimed at placating the opposition. There is also a feedback mechanism whereby the higher consumption leads to less instability as government consumption reduces the risk oflosing office. Empirical evidence based on panel estirnation supports this hypothesis.

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.The Stability and Growth Pact has been a success in numerous EU countries, especially in guiding them toward underlying fiscal balance ahead of population aging. These countries tend to be smaller, subject to greater macroeconomic volatility, and reliant on a form of fiscal governance that emphasizes targets and contracts. Most of the new members share these characteristics. For the countries less compatible with the Pact, domestic governance reforms that increase the reputational costs for noncompliance can be useful complements to the fiscal framework.

The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or lMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. It is now well established that political and institutional factors matter for fiscal outcomes. Following a review of the literature, this paper examines the relationship between a variety of political-institutional variables and fiscal aggregates-encompassing the overall balance as well as expenditure and revenue and their various components-across 19 industrial countries over the past two decades. It finds strong effects on fiscal policy from such factors as type of electoral system, degree of legislative or government fragmentation, and stability of government. Some of tbe strongest results emerge for certain components of expenditure, such as transfers, and for the balance between labor and consumption taxation. There are clear relationships between the type of political system and choice of tax and expenditure system. The paper also examines fiscal adjustment since the late 1980s in light of these political factors, finding some evidence of a reversal in trend, but only when growth has been high or when debt has become problematic.

This Policy Discussion Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Policy Discussion Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Policy Discussion Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.Welfare states can be reformed successfully, and popular support for reforms can be maintained. But this requires an internally consistent package of labor market, fiscal, and product market reforms, including some kind of buy-in, through, for example, tax cuts. Empirical analysis combined with a select number of case studies-comprising Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom-reveals that successful reformers focused on increasing labor supply through benefit reform, lowering tax wedges, and lowering government consumption. At the same time, greater labor supply translated into employment growth more effectively in the presence of liberal labor and product markets.

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