No abstract

We advance and test a theory of grant compliance in single-shot games by combining the insights on grant management from Pressman and Wildavsky's classic work with the role that goal congruence and local political institutions play in the intergovernmental grant process. One-time grants, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, require unique grant management techniques on the part of the federal government and local political institutions to foster credible commitments between federal and local authorities. Based on administrative records from the U.S. Department of Energy and a national survey of local government recipients of DOE grants, we predict delay in expending grant funds given that the goal of the federal government is to rapidly stimulate the economy and produce gains in energy efficiency. We employ survival modeling to estimate the time from receipt of a stimulus grant until the funds are expended. We find compelling evidence that effective grant management and local government institutions and policies are salient for limiting delays.

No abstract