We here use panel data from the COME-HERE survey to track income inequality during COVID-19 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Relative inequality in equivalent household disposable income among individuals changed in a hump-shaped way between January 2020 and January 2021, with an initial rise from January to May 2020 being more than reversed by September 2020. Absolute inequality also fell over this period. Due to the pandemic some households lost more than others, and government compensation schemes were targeted towards the poorest, implying that on average income differences decreased. Generalized Lorenz domination reveals that these distributive changes reduced welfare in Italy.

This paper assesses the causal effect of partial employment protection on workers' subjective job security via the perceived probability of layoff. We consider the rise in the French Delalande tax, which is paid by private firms if they lay off older workers. This reform was restricted to large firms and therefore allows us to use a difference-indifference strategy. In ECHP data, we find that the change in the perceived probability of layoffs induced by the higher Delalande tax improved the subjective job security of older (protected) workers, but at the cost of a negative externality on younger (unprotected) workers. While the fall in perceived job security of younger workers is mirrored by actual increase in their layoff rate, the rise in perceived job security of older workers is more puzzling because we do not observe a reduction in their layoff rate.

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Job insecurity can have wide-ranging consequences outside of the labour market. A 1999 rise in the French layoff tax paid by large private firms when they laid off older workers made younger workers less secure; this insecurity reduced their fertility by 3.7 percentage points (with a 95% confidence interval between 0.7 and 6.6 percentage points). Reduced fertility is only found at the intensive margin: job insecurity reduces family size but not the probability of parenthood itself. Our results also suggest negative selection into parenthood, as this fertility effect does not appear for low-income and less-educated workers.