These results indicate that campylobacter and immunoproliferative small intestinal disease are associated and that C. jejuni should be added to the growing list of human pathogens responsible for immunoproliferative states.

A major lesson of the recent …nancial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This paper studies the e¢ ciency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. We consider two di¤erent types of liquidity shocks leading to di¤erent implications for optimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregate liquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Two di¤erent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required to cope with the two di¤erent types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes …nancial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs. A major lesson of the recent …nancial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This paper studies the e¢ ciency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. We consider two di¤erent types of liquidity shocks leading to di¤erent implications for optimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned.In addition, we show that, during an aggregate liquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Two di¤erent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required to cope with the two di¤erent types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes …nancial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs.

The repo market has been viewed as a potential source of financial instability since the 2007-09 financial crisis, owing in part to findings that margins increased sharply in a segment of this market. This paper provides evidence suggesting that no system-wide run on repo occurred. Using confidential data on tri-party repo, a major segment of this market, we show that the level of margins and the amount of funding were surprisingly stable for most borrowers during the crisis. However, we also document a sharp decline in the tri-party repo funding of Lehman in September 2008.

The repo market has been viewed as a potential source of financial instability since the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, based in part on findings that margins increased sharply in a segment of this market. This paper provides evidence suggesting that there was no system-wide run on repo. Using confidential data on tri-party repo, a major segment of this market, we show that, the level of margins and the amount of funding were surprisingly stable for most borrowers during the crisis. However, we also document a sharp decline in the tri-party repo funding of Lehman in September 2008. of the Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure for helpful comments on an earlier draft. We would also like to thank an anonymous referee and Associate Editor for their helpful suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.The Journal of Finance R percentage, is called the "margin" and measures the extent to which the cash loan is overcollateralized. 1 The repo market is an important financial market because it is a key source of short-term funding for securities dealers and some of their clients. 2 This market is also critical for secondary market liquidity in Treasuries and other securities, and plays an important role in the pricing and price discovery of cash and derivatives instruments.The U.S. repo market comprises several segments. As we describe in detail in Section I, it is useful to distinguish the bilateral market, where the settlement of the repo is handled by the trading parties, from the tri-party repo market, where a third party provides settlement and collateral management services. These two segments behaved very differently during the crisis.Gorton and Metrick (2012) study data from a high-quality dealer trading with other high-quality dealers in the bilateral repo market. They show that margins increased dramatically, similar to the "margin spirals" modeled in Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009) (see also Adrian and Shin (2010)). Looking at data from another segment of the bilateral market, in which dealers lend to their clients (notably hedge funds), we find similar increases in margins.Hence, it appears that the bilateral repo market suffered from a tightening of financing conditions. In the tri-party repo market, however, margins for all but the lowest quality collateral changed very little, as shown in Figure 1.We discuss this figure in more detail later in the paper, but note here that margins for repos collateralized by U.S. Treasuries and agency debentures did not change throughout the crisis. Furthermore, margins for repos backed by the lowest quality collateral used in the tri-party repo market, labeled "nongovernment," increased by only two percentage points, from 5% to 7%. This increase is much less pronounced than in the bilateral market we study. Figure 2 shows the differences in the average margin for overnight repos between the segment of the bilateral market for which we have data and the tri-party repo market. These spreads are sizable for corporate bonds (over 10 percentage points in 2009) and en...

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