This paper discusses fees and costs of pension companies in transition economies drawing on examples from four countries – Croatia, Hungary, Kazakhstan and Poland – where second pillar pensions have the longest history of implementation. It finds that at current levels, charges are likely to reduce returns on individual account balances by around 1% per annum on average. Exact rates vary by country and company. Fee structures are complex and, generally speaking, poorly understood by consumers. The limited information on costs that is available suggests that, by and large, companies are able to meet their operating costs within a few years after starting operations. There are large sunk costs in setting up business. As a result the industry displays strong economies of scale. Based on the available evidence, the paper estimates fixed costs to be of the order of $35 per account per year (the 95% confidence interval is $21–$49 per account per year). Given costs of this order of magnitude, individual accounts need to be of the order of 4–6% of average wages for the second pillar to be viable i.e. to deliver a return greater than what can be expected from an unchanged first pillar.

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Egypt accelerated its ongoing transition from a public sector dominated economy to a private sector led and market oriented economy after the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s. Some aspects of the economy, such as trade policy, have been substantially transformed since then whereas other aspects, such as public control of the financial sector, have experienced less change in substance. We examine some determinants of growth in Egypt since the mid-1980s using insights from both standard econometric techniques and a diagnostic approach proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2004). We find that trends in government consumption, credit to the private sector and the average growth rate of OECD countries have been significant determinants of growth in Egypt in the past. We also present evidence that suggests that inefficiency of financial intermediation is a significant current constraint on growth.