We provide quantitative predictions of first-order supply and demand shocks for the US economy associated with the COVID-19 pandemic at the level of individual occupations and industries. To analyse the supply shock, we classify industries as essential or non-essential and construct a Remote Labour Index, which measures the ability of different occupations to work from home. Demand shocks are based on a study of the likely effect of a severe influenza epidemic developed by the US Congressional Budget Office. Compared to the pre-COVID period, these shocks would threaten around 20 per cent of the US economy’s GDP, jeopardize 23 per cent of jobs, and reduce total wage income by 16 per cent. At the industry level, sectors such as transport are likely to be output-constrained by demand shocks, while sectors relating to manufacturing, mining, and services are more likely to be constrained by supply shocks. Entertainment, restaurants, and tourism face large supply and demand shocks. At the occupation level, we show that high-wage occupations are relatively immune from adverse supply- and demand-side shocks, while low-wage occupations are much more vulnerable. We should emphasize that our results are only first-order shocks—we expect them to be substantially amplified by feedback effects in the production network.

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We quantify how much systemic risk can be eliminated in financial contract networks by rearranging their network topology. By using mixed integer linear programming, financial linkages are optimally organized, whereas the overall economic conditions of banks, such as capital buffers, total interbank assets and liabilities, and average risk-weighted exposure remain unchanged. We apply the new optimization procedure to 10 snapshots of the Austrian interbank market where we focus on the largest 70 banks covering 71% of the market volume. The optimization reduces systemic risk (measured in DebtRank) by about 70%, showing the huge potential that changing the network structure has on the mitigation of financial contagion. Existing capital levels would need to be scaled up by a factor of 3.3 to obtain similar levels of DebtRank. These findings underline the importance of macroprudential rules that focus on the structure of financial networks. The new optimization procedure allows us to benchmark actual networks to networks with minimal systemic risk. We find that simple topological measures, like link density, degree assortativity, or clustering coefficient, fail to explain the large differences in systemic risk between actual and optimal networks. We find that if the most systemically relevant banks are tightly connected, overall systemic risk is higher than if they are unconnected.