Over the last five years there has been an increase in the frequency and diversity of network attacks. This holds true, as more and more organisations admit compromises on a daily basis. Many misuse and anomaly based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that rely on either signatures, supervised or statistical methods have been proposed in the literature, but their trustworthiness is debatable. Moreover, as this work uncovers, the current IDSs are based on obsolete attack classes that do not reflect the current attack trends. For these reasons, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of unsupervised and hybrid methods for intrusion detection, discussing their potential in the domain. We also present and highlight the importance of feature engineering techniques that have been proposed for intrusion detection. Furthermore, we discuss that current IDSs should evolve from simple detection to correlation and attribution. We descant how IDS data could be used to reconstruct and correlate attacks to identify attackers, with the use of advanced data analytics techniques. Finally, we argue how the present IDS attack classes can be extended to match the modern attacks and propose three new classes regarding the outgoing network communication.
Cyber attacks consisting of several attack actions can present considerable challenge to forensic investigations. Consider the case where a cybersecurity breach is suspected following the discovery of one attack action, for example by observing the modification of sensitive registry keys, suspicious network traffic patterns, or the abuse of legitimate credentials. At this point, the investigator can have multiple options as to what to check next to discover the rest, and will likely pick one based on experience and training. This will be the case at each new step. We argue that the efficiency of this aspect of the job, which is the selection of what next step to take, can have significant impact on its overall cost (e.g., the duration) of the investigation and can be improved through the application of constrained optimization techniques.Here, we present DISCLOSE, the first data-driven decision support framework for optimizing forensic investigations of cybersecurity breaches. DISCLOSE benefits from a repository of known adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), for each of which it harvests threat intelligence information to calculate its probabilistic relations with the rest. These relations, as well as a proximity parameter derived from the projection of quantitative data regarding the adversarial TTPs on an attack life cycle model, are both used as input to our optimization framework. We show the feasibility of this approach in a case study that consists of 31 adversarial TTPs, data collected from 6 interviews with experienced cybersecurity professionals and data extracted from the MITRE ATT&CK STIX repository and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
Phishing is one of the most common threats that users face while browsing the web. In the current threat landscape, a targeted phishing attack (i.e., spear phishing) often constitutes the first action of a threat actor during an intrusion campaign. To tackle this threat, many data-driven approaches have been proposed, which mostly rely on the use of supervised machine learning under a single-layer approach. However, such approaches are resource-demanding and, thus, their deployment in production environments is infeasible. Moreover, most previous works utilise a feature set that can be easily tampered with by adversaries. In this paper, we investigate the use of a multi-layered detection framework in which a potential phishing domain is classified multiple times by models using different feature sets. In our work, an additional classification takes place only when the initial one scores below a predefined confidence level, which is set by the system owner. We demonstrate our approach by implementing a two-layered detection system, which uses supervised machine learning to identify phishing attacks. We evaluate our system with a dataset consisting of active phishing attacks and find that its performance is comparable to the state of the art.
Desktop browsers have introduced private browsing mode, a security control which aims to protect users' data that are generated during a private browsing session, by not storing them in the file system. As the Internet becomes ubiquitous, the existence of this security control is beneficial to users, since privacy violations are increasing, while users tend to be more concerned about their privacy when browsing the web in a post-Snowden era. In this context, this work examines the protection that is offered by the private browsing mode of the most popular desktop browsers in Windows (i.e., Chrome, Firefox, IE and Opera). Our experiments uncover occasions in which even if users browse the web with a private session, privacy violations exist contrary to what is documented by the browser. To raise the bar of privacy protection that is offered by web browsers, we propose the use of a virtual filesystem as the storage medium of browsers' cache data. We demonstrate with a case study how this countermeasure protects users from the privacy violations, which are previously identified in this work.
The use of anti-forensic techniques is a very common practice that stealthy adversaries may deploy to minimise their traces and make the investigation of an incident harder by evading detection and attribution. In this paper, we study the interaction between a cyber forensic Investigator and a strategic Attacker using a game-theoretic framework. This is based on a Bayesian game of incomplete information played on a multi-host cyber forensics investigation graph of actions traversed by both players. The edges of the graph represent players’ actions across different hosts in a network. In alignment with the concept of Bayesian games, we define two Attacker types to represent their ability of deploying anti-forensic techniques to conceal their activities. In this way, our model allows the Investigator to identify the optimal investigating policy taking into consideration the cost and impact of the available actions, while coping with the uncertainty of the Attacker’s type and strategic decisions. To evaluate our model, we construct a realistic case study based on threat reports and data extracted from the MITRE ATT&CK STIX repository, Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), and interviews with cyber-security practitioners. We use the case study to compare the performance of the proposed method against two other investigative methods and three different types of Attackers.
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