We present the Calculus of Context-aware Ambients (CCA in short) for the modelling and verification of mobile systems that are context-aware. This process calculus is built upon the calculus of mobile ambients and introduces new constructs to enable ambients and processes to be aware of the environment in which they are being executed. This results in a powerful calculus where both mobility and context-awareness are first-class citizens. We present the syntax and a formal semantics of the calculus. We propose a new theory of equivalence of processes which allows the identification of systems that have the same context-aware behaviours. We prove that CCA encodes the π -calculus which is known to be a universal model of computation. Finally, we illustrate the pragmatics of the calculus through many examples and a real-world case study of a context-aware hospital bed.

Current ontological specifications for semantically describing properties of Web services are limited to their static interface description. Normally for proving properties of service compositions, mapping input/output parameters and specifying the pre/post conditions are found to be sufficient. However, these properties are assertions only on the initial and final states of the service respectively. They do not help in specifying/verifying ongoing behaviour of an individual service or a composed system. We propose a framework for enriching semantic service descriptions with two compositional assertions: assumption and commitment that facilitate reasoning about service composition and verification of their integration. The technique is based on Interval Temporal Logic(ITL): a sound formalism for specifying and proving temporal properties of systems. Our approach utilizes the recently proposed Semantic Web Rule Language.

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are widely deployed in nation's critical national infrastructures such as utilities, transport, banking and health-care. Whilst Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are commonly deployed to monitor real-time data and operations taking place in the ICS they are typically not equipped to monitor the functional behaviour of individual components. In this paper (This paper expands on an earlier position paper presented at the International Symposium for Industrial Control System and SCADA Cyber Security Research 2014), we are presenting a runtime-monitoring technology that provides assurances of the functional behaviour of ICS components and demonstrates how this can be used to provide additional protection of the ICS against cyber attacks similar to the well-known Stuxnet attack.

Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) was designed as a tool for the specification and verification of systems. The development of an executable subset of ITL, namely Tempura, was an important step in the use of temporal logic as it enables the developer to check, debug and simulate the design. However, a design methodology is missing that transforms an abstract ITL specification to an executable (concrete) Tempura program. The paper describes a development technique for ITL based on refinement calculus. The technique allows the development to proceed from high level "abstract" system specification to low level "concrete" implementation via a series of correctness preserving refinement steps. It also permits a mixture of abstract specification and concrete implementation at any development step. To allow the development of such a technique, ITL is extended to include modularity, resources and explicit communication. This allows synchronous, asynchronous and shared variable concurrency to be explicitly expressed. These constructs also help in solving the problems, like lack of expressing modularity, timing and communication, discovered during the use of ITL and Tempura for a large-scale application[2].