The issue of how to organize and implement a European security and defence 'identity' has been discussed at both the political and the academic level throughout the past decade. Initially, it was basically related only to NATO or, at best, to the NATO-WEU interface. As such, it did not make much progress, in spite of the commitments taken especially in Berlin (1996) and the limited decisions adopted in the WEU framework in 1997. Even at that time, the main bones of contention were the extent to which NATO 'assets and capabilities' would be put at the disposal of 'European-led' peace support operations and, as a consequence, the role and the rights of those European allies that were not full members of the WEU. With the onset of the ESDP and the de facto withering away of the WEU, the issue has become a bilateral one between the European Union and the Alliance. The controversial points have remained more or less the same, but the political and legal contexts have changed. Ever since, apparently, the main obstacle to an arrangement between the two organizations allowing the EU to have 'assured access' to NATO planning capabilities has been Turkey's attitude. The article examines in detail all the problems involved, assessing the current state of affairs and drawing some conclusions for the future.

Since the drafting of the European Security Strategy in 2003, the European Union has devoted ever more attention to the various emergencies that affect the safety and security of its citizens. Europe's history is already full of examples and precedents of such challenges and related responses. Today, natural and human-made disasters, acts of terrorism and large-scale disruptions of civilian life constitute contingencies that require policy attention and preparedness at all levels of government. They often call into question traditional barriers between policy arenas at both the national and European level. Within the EU proper, the relevant competences and capabilities are still fledgling and scattered across different institutions and bodies, but progress is being made towards better co-ordination and synergy across the policy board.

No abstract

No abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has once again seen the use of the military in support of civilian authorities. Since pandemics and other non-military challenges are likely to grow in scope and frequency, the use of the military in such contingencies will also become the ‘new normal’. However, to make the employment of the military more effective, a number of additional steps need to be taken. These range from closer cooperation of key international institutions such as the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to specific improvements in national pandemic preparedness. Moreover, these steps must also include the establishment of a broader political framework that centres on resilience as a central paradigm and helps insulating military contributions from political antagonisms and deliberate disinformation. COVID-19, pandemic, resilience, total defence, European Union, NATO, cyber, disinformation, emerging technologies, hybrid