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This paper examines the relationship between governance variables and voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in a sample of European biotechnology firms. We extend previous research by simultaneously considering governance mechanisms such as the proportion of independent directors, board dimension, CEO duality and board structure in relationship to voluntary disclosure on intellectual capital. We understand voluntary disclosure as a multidimensional and complex concept and, hence, use the semantic properties of the information disclosed, and on the content of information, as proxies for the quality of disclosure. Our results suggest that governance-related variables strongly influence the quantity of information disclosed, thus confirming our hypotheses. In regard to the quality of disclosure, our results show that (1) the proportion of independent directors is positively related to the disclosure of internal structure, (2) CEO duality is negatively linked to the disclosure of forward-looking information, and (3) board structure helps to improve the annual report's overall readability. We contribute to agency theory by indicating that corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure can be used strategically to reduce agency conflicts. The results of this study might be of interest to regulators, investment analysts and market participants.

This paper examines whether and how fair value measurement and disclosure by US bank holding companies influences financial analysts’ ability to forecast earnings. Fair value measurement relates to more dispersed forecasts. Measurement basis disclosure (levels 1, 2 and 3) enacted by SFAS 157 translates into more accurate forecasts but has neutral effects for banks with a sizable proportion of assets at fair value. Furthermore, level 2 measurement relates to enhanced forecast accuracy, while level 3 measurement relates to increased forecast dispersion. These contrasting results reflect analysts’ underlying information environment, with level 2 measurement translating into higher quality private and public information and level 3 into reductions in the quality of private and public information. Results do not change after controlling for assets’ underlying riskiness. Overall, it appears that analysts perceive that managers convey useful information through level 2 figures but act opportunistically in measuring level 3 fair value figures

This paper examines the relationship between firm complexity and board of director composition. Utilising the board typology of Baysinger and Zardkoohi (1986 ), we classify board members either as insiders, business experts, support specialists, or community influentials, and examine board composition in relation to firm internal and external complexity. Internal complexity refers to the sophistication of internal work processes (proxied by firm R&D expenditures, and the amount of invested capital), while external complexity relates to the external competitive structure (proxied by the number of business and geographic segments, and industrial leadership). Utilising a random sample of 150 firms drawn from six industries over the 2003-2005 time period, and after classifying 4,408 directors to one of our board categories, multivariate results confirm conjectures that complexity is related to the specific capabilities that each board member brings to the firm. We find that externally complex firms substitute community influentials for insiders. Additionally, internally complex firms have lower levels of community influentials, which are substituted by insiders and support specialists. This study adds to a small but growing literature that examines the economic determinants of board structure ( Boone "et al.", 2007 ; Coles "et al.", 2005 ; Gillan "et al.", 2003 ; Linck "et al.", 2005 ), by providing a unique lens in examining board characteristics that goes beyond the traditional insider/independent classification. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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