U radu se razmatraju najvažnija pitanja odgovornosti članova organa društava koja se nalaze u sastavu faktičnog koncerna. Odgovornost članova organa društava u faktičnom koncernu ultimativno ovisi o opsegu njihovih ovlasti. Da bi se utvrdile te ovlasti prvo se razmatra pojam faktičnog koncerna u kontekstu prava povezanih društava, a potom i učinci koncernskog prava na odnos između vladajućeg i ovisnog društva. Dolazi se do zaključka da, iako to ne bi smjelo, vladajuće društvo redovito može navesti ovisno društvo na određeno postupanje. Zbog toga je prvenstvena svrha pravila o granicama utjecaja vladajućeg društva zaštititi manjinske članove i vjerovnike ovisnoga društva zabranom davanja uputa koje su štetne po ovisno društvo. Vladajuće društvo ovlašteno je davati štetne upute ovisnome društvu, samo iznimno, kada mu ih nadoknadi ili se obveže nadoknaditi do kraja poslovne godine. Takav privilegij vladajućeg društva je uravnotežen pravilima o objektivnoj odgovornosti vladajućeg društva za štetu te pravilima o odgovornosti za štetu njegovih zakonskih zastupnika na temelju pretpostavljene krivnje. Za učinkovitu zaštitu ovisnoga društva ključna je uloga njegove uprave koja je dužna pozornošću urednog i savjesnog gospodarstvenika procijeniti jesu li upute štetne po ovisno društvo te, ako jesu, je li ih vladajuće društvo spremno i u mogućnosti nadoknaditi.

This paper observes the transfer of a company seat to a different Member State as an expression of the EU freedom of establishment. The reason for such analysis is the recent and somewhat controversial "Polbud" decision. The Court decided that a company enjoys the freedom of establishment to transfer its registered seat to another Member State despite the fact that it will not perform any economic activity there. In addition, the Court held that the mandatory liquidation of a company goes beyond what is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of minority shareholders, creditors, and employees. The paper scrutinizes both findings. A special attention is devoted to the role of an actual economic activity for the notion of the freedom of establishment. The paper arrives to the conclusion that, along with the freedom to actually perform economic activity, the freedom of establishment includes the freedom to use all national legal forms suitable for performing of an economic activity. As to the second finding, although it is possible that the mandatory liquidation indeed goes beyond necessary, the Court failed to demonstrate that this was the case.

The trader and the commercial contract are the basic notions of the commercial law. The trader is defined in various Croatian statutes so many times that it is questionable whether it represents a single notion. Everything is more complicated by the notion of undertaking which is defined in a similar multitude of statutes. Although the legislator is authorized to introduce as many definitions as it wants, the current state of affairs does not contribute to the transparency and legal certainty. The paper tries to establish firm criteria for a possible future systematization. Two models are singled out, based on the criterion whether a trader is considered as such in all legal transactions (an absolute model) or just for the needs of a specific transaction (a functional, transactional model). The chosen model affects the definition of the commercial contract. If the commercial contract begins with an absolute model of a trader, it is advisable that the contract falls within trader’s commercial activity. The Croatian law, however, adopted an asymmetric definition, which requires that the contract falls within the commercial activity of only one of the traders.

rad izrađen uz potporu Hrvatske zaklade za znanost, projekt br. 9366 "Pravni aspekti korporativnih akvizicija i restrukturiranje društava utemeljenih na znanju" i Sveučilišta u Rijeci, projekt br. 13.08.1.2.01 "Zaštita korisnika na hrvatskom i europskom tržištu financijskih usluga". UČINKOVITO UPRAVLJANJE U KONCERNUDoc. dr. sc. Antun Bilić* UDK: 347.72 Prof. dr. sc. Siniša Petrović** https://doi.org/10.30925/zpfsr.39.4.7 Ur.: 3. rujna 2018. Pr.: 15. listopada 2018. Izvorni znanstveni rad Sažetak Rad razmatra modalitete učinkovitog upravljanja u različitim oblicima koncerna. Definicija koncerna, kao skup društava objedinjenih jedinstvenim vođenjem, podrazumijeva određeni stupanj integracije upravljanja. S druge strane, okolnost da svako od društava zadržava vlastitu pravnu osobnost sugerira barem djelomičnu upravljačku samostalnost. Granice međusobnog utjecaja društava koncerna su, dakle, određene suprotstavljenim centrifugalnim i centripetalnim silama. Na pravu povezanih društava je da jasno definira te granice i stavi ih na raspolaganje poduzetnicima da ih najbolje iskoriste prema svojim potrebama. Kao što će se pokazati takve granice nisu iste za sve vrste koncerna. U radu se detaljnije razmatraju tri oblika koncerna vladajućeg i ovisnog društva -ugovorni koncern, koncern priključenih društava i faktični koncern. Ključne riječi: učinkovito upravljanje; uprava; ugovorni koncern; koncern priključenih društava; faktični koncern; vladajuće i ovisno društvo.

The High Commercial Court held that the power of attorney to enter into a share transfer agreement must be executed in the form required for the share transfer agreement itself – that of a notarial act or a private document certified by a public notary. In the absence of such form, the share transfer agreement is invalid. This paper examines whether this conclusion is justified. Although the High Commercial Court correctly applied the requirement of “parity” between the form of an agreement and the power of attorney for its conclusion, this rule should be restricted whenever the form’s primary purpose is not the protection of the parties. Furthermore, other statutes suggest that the share transfer agreement can be entered into on the basis of a written power of attorney with the signature authenticated by a public notary. Finally, even if the “parity” rule is literally applied, the absence of parity does not cause the invalidity of the share transfer agreement, but only its temporary ineffectiveness, which can be cured by the principal’s approval.