This study takes into account the National Stock Exchange (NSE)-listed Indian companies, which constitute the CNX Nifty Index, for the period from 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2013. Tobin's Q, market value added, cash earnings per share and return on capital employed have been used as the corporate performance variables in the study; the first two being market-based and the last two being accounting-based measures. Board size (BS), board composition, ownership structure, multiplicity of directorship, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, CEO tenure and executive remuneration have been used as corporate governance surrogates from different dimensions along with other widely used independent variables to see their effect on corporate performance in a panel-data-based regression. BS and foreign promoters' (FPs') shareholdings have been identified to have a positive impact on more than one corporate performance variable. Among the remaining independent variables, assets turnover is positively related with the performance variables.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

The study advances the existing literature on corporate finance and governance by establishing a non-linear effect of large ownership on the enterprise value of Indian manufacturing firms. The study employs both static and dynamic panel models on a set of panel data consisting of 112 Indian manufacturing firms. The study establishes a U-shaped relationship between large ownership and enterprise value of the sampled firms. Large promoters until 34% of ownership are found to exert a negative effect on enterprise value which signifies expropriation effect along with poor alignment of interest with the firms. However, for ownership concentration by promoters after the said threshold, the effect is found to be positive signifying improved alignment of interests, efficient monitoring and disciplining of managerial opportunistic behaviour. Based on the findings, the study suggests the Indian manufacturing firms not to entirely rely on the role of large owners and to opt for improved external regulatory and institutional establishment for the protection of minority shareholders’ interest and ensuring stringent corporate governance.