This study illustrates how control-ownership wedge impacts the monitoring role of the corporate board through the quality of audit services in Turkey. Turkey has made essential amendments in the field of external audit in order to enhance the quality of the financial report and integrate its own capital market with that of the EU. It would be of interest to examine the influence of these changes on clients' demand for high quality audit. The agency theory is integrated with the resource dependence theory to show that boards possess distinct incentives and ability to demand high quality audit to monitor management activities. Logistic regression and feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) were used for regression estimations. The results indicate that board demographics, cognitive and structural diversity of board of directors, audit committee characteristics and audit quality are complementary and control-ownership wedge weakens the relationship between them which is an unfavorable outcome for minority shareholders. Thus, this study proposes that regulators should increase law enforcement to enhance good corporate governance in Turkey to accommodate the unique features of wedge firms and provide a protected environment for minority shareholders.

This study investigates the factors impact on internal audit effectiveness (IAE) in Kurdistan Iraq. Data were collected from 15 directors of Colleges and 15 internal audit managers at University of Duhok. The relationship between IAE and three principle factors has been examined using multiple regression analysis. Findings reflect that management support for IAE perceived effectiveness of internal audit from both directors of colleges and internal auditor’s perspective. Management support is related to occupy experienced and trained staff, providing sufficient resources. However, this study found insignificant relationship between independence of the internal audit and internal audit effectiveness.

The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between minority shareholders' rights and audit quality. Specifically, this paper examines the influence of minority shareholders' with at least 10% holdings on clients' demand for strong monitorin particularly in terms of high audit quality. The sample comprises the top 100 listed firms on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) for 2014 and 2015. The finding of this paper is aligned with the propositions of the agency theory that minority shareholders with at least 10% holdings improve clients' demand for high audit quality. The findings of this paper have some implications for future studies on the role of minority shareholders to monitor management activities. This paper calls for future studies in the area of accounting and finance to introduce and operationalize a new measurement of Type II agency cost in order to better understand the agency conflicts within this unique market as well as the state of the minority shareholders on the BIST.

This paper examines the impact of Board characteristics (board size, board independence, and board gender) on the corporate policy of dividend for a set of 132 firm-year listed companies of the manufacturing sector from Amman Stock Exchange between the years 2016-2018.. The paper uses logistic regression in analyzing the sample and the results show that there is a positive relationship between the Board of directors' characteristics (Board size, board diversity depicted as outside directors and board gender) and the corporate dividend policy. Our recommendations are that Jordanian manufacturing companies should comply with the Jordanian code of corporate governance and diversify their corporate boards of directors by appointing more outside directors and more female directors within their boards. This will also help to create a healthy relationship between the boards and the owners of the firms or the shareholders and minimize the agency conflict theory MAKALE BİLGİLERİ

This study aims to highlight the importance of protecting investors' rights,and particularly those of minority shareholders. This study addresses the predominant control-ownership structure of the top 100 firms listed in Bursa Istanbul (BI) using the data for 2015. It shows the most common control-ownership structure within business groups, in which shareholders exercise control over a group of firms and maintain a small stake of firms' equities. Turkish firms are categorised with highly concentrated ownership and families' being the dominant shareholders owning more than 80% of all publically listed firms in BI. The study results indicate that the divergence between cash rights and control rights (wedge)in the top 100 Turkish firms is mainly achieved through pyramidal-ownership structure, dual class shares,