Bitcoin is a major virtual currency. Using weekly data over the [2010][2011][2012][2013] period, we analyze a Bitcoin investment from the standpoint of a U.S. investor with a diversified portfolio including both traditional assets (worldwide stocks, bonds, hard currencies) and alternative investments (commodities, hedge funds, real estate). Over the period under consideration, Bitcoin investment had highly distinctive features, including exceptionally high average return and volatility. Its correlation with other assets was remarkably low. Spanning tests confirm that Bitcoin investment offers significant diversification benefits. We show that the inclusion of even a small proportion of Bitcoins may dramatically improve the risk-return trade-off of well-diversified portfolios. Results should however be taken with caution as the data may reflect early-stage behavior which may not last in the medium or long run. Results should however be taken with caution as the data may reflect early-stage behavior which may not last in the medium or long run.3

This paper sheds light on a poorly understood phenomenon in microfinance which is often referred to as a "mission drift": A tendency reviewed by numerous microfinance institutions to extend larger average loan sizes in the process of scaling-up. We argue that this phenomenon is not driven by transaction cost minimization alone. Instead, poverty-oriented microfinance institutions could potentially deviate from their mission by extending larger loan sizes neither because of "progressive lending" nor because of "cross-subsidization" but because of the interplay between their own mission, the cost differentials between poor and unbanked wealthier clients, and region-specific characteristics pertaining the heterogeneity of their clientele. In a simple one-period framework we pin-down the conditions under which mission drift can emerge. Our framework shows that there is a thin line between mission drift and crosssubsidization, which in turn makes it difficult for empirical researchers to establish whether a microfinance institution has deviated from its povertyreduction mission. This paper also suggests that institutions operating in regions which host a relatively small number of very poor individuals might be misleadingly perceived as deviating from their mission. Because existing empirical studies cannot tear apart between mission drift and crosssubsidization, these studies should not guide donors and socially responsible investors pertaining resource allocation across institutions offering financial services to the poor. The difficulty in tearing apart cross-subsidization and mission drift is discussed in light of the contrasting experiences between microfinance institutions operating in Latin America and South Asia. ABSTRACTThis paper sheds light on a poorly understood phenomenon in microfinance which is often referred to as a "mission drift": A tendency reviewed by numerous microfinance institutions to extend larger average loan sizes in the process of scaling-up. We argue that this phenomenon is not driven by transaction cost minimization alone. Instead, poverty-oriented microfinance institutions could potentially deviate from their mission by extending larger loan sizes neither because of "progressive lending" nor because of "cross-subsidization" but because of the interplay between their own mission, the cost differentials between poor and unbanked wealthier clients, and region-specific characteristics pertaining the heterogeneity of their clientele. In a simple one-period framework we pin-down the conditions under which mission drift can emerge. Our framework shows that there is a thin line between mission drift and cross-subsidization, which in turn makes it difficult for empirical researchers to establish whether a microfinance institution has deviated from its poverty-reduction mission. This paper also suggests that institutions operating in regions which host a relatively small number of very poor individuals might be misleadingly perceived as deviating from their mission. Because existing empirical stu...

Social banks are financial intermediaries paying attention to non-economic (i.e. social, ethical, and environmental) criteria. To investigate the behavior of social banks on the credit market, this paper proposes both theory and empirics. Our theoretical model rationalizes the idea that reciprocity can generate better repayment performances. Based on a unique hand-collected dataset released by a French social bank, our empirical results are twofold. First, we show that the bank charges below-market interest rates for social projects. Second, regardless of their creditworthiness, motivated borrowers respond to advantageous credit terms by significantly lowering their probability of default. We interpret this outcome as the first evidence of reciprocity in the credit market. show that the bank charges below-market interest rates for social projects. Second, regardless of their creditworthiness, motivated borrowers respond to advantageous credit terms by significantly lowering their probability of default. We interpret this outcome as the first evidence of reciprocity in the credit market.

Microfinance institutions serve a majority of female borrowers. But do men and women benefit from same credit conditions? This paper investigates this issue by presenting an original model and testing its predictions on an exceptional database including 34,000 loan applications from a Brazilian microfinance institution over an eleven-year period. The model considers a lender that offers standardized loan contracts with a fixed interest rate, which is common practice in microfinance. It demonstrates that biased loan attribution may lead to three different outcomes, depending on the bias intensity: 1) denial of all applications from a given group, 2) a "glass ceiling" effect, namely loan downsizing of the largest projects from a given group, or 3) no impact. The empirical analysis detects no gender bias in approval rate, but uncovers a glass ceiling effect hurting female applicants. Moreover, this effect is insensitive to the credit officer's gender. In conclusion, the good news is that the microfinance practice does ensure a fair access to credit. The bad news is the presence of a glass ceiling faced by female entrepreneurs with larger projects. AbstractMicronance institutions serve a majority of female borrowers. But do men and women benet from same credit conditions ? This paper investigates this issue by presenting an original model and testing its predictions on an exceptional database including 34,000 loan applications from a Brazilian micronance institution over an eleven-year period. The model considers a lender that oers standardized loan contracts with a xed interest rate, which is common practice in micronance. It demonstrates that biased loan attribution may lead to three dierent outcomes, depending on the bias intensity: 1) denial of all applications from a given group, 2) a glass ceiling eect, namely loan downsizing of the largest projects from a given group, or 3) no impact. The empirical analysis detects no gender bias in approval rate, but uncovers a glass ceiling eect hurting female applicants. Moreover, this eect is insensitive to the credit ocer's gender. In conclusion, the good news is that the micronance practice does ensure a fair access to credit. The bad news is the presence of a glass ceiling faced by female entrepreneurs with larger projects.