This paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in Japan's SME loan market. We find that firms' riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used. We find, however, that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively, and that borrowers who have a long-term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral. These findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank's seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring. This incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees. JEL classification number: D82, G21, G30

This paper investigates the effect of banks' lending capacity on firms' capital investment. To overcome the difficulties in identifying purely exogenous shocks to firms' bank financing, we utilize the natural experiment provided by the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995. Using a unique firm-level dataset that allows us to identify firms and banks in the earthquake-affected area, together with information on bank-firm relationships, we find that the investment ratio of firms located outside of the earthquake-affected area but with their main banks inside the area was lower than that of firms that were both located and had their main banks outside of the area. This result implies that the weakened lending capacity of damaged banks exacerbated the borrowing constraints on the investment of their undamaged client firms. We also find that the negative impact is robust for two alternative measures of bank damage: that to the bank headquarters and that to the branch network. However, the impacts of the two are different in timing; while that of the former emerged immediately after the earthquake, the latter emerged with a one-year lag.

This paper examines the ex-post performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that obtained small business credit scoring (SBCS) loans. Using a unique Japanese firm-bank matched dataset, we identify whether an SME has obtained an SBCS loan and, if so, from which type of bank: a relationship lender or a transactional lender. We find that the ex-post probability of default after the SBCS loan was provided significantly increased for SMEs that obtained an SBCS loan from a transactional lender. We also find that the lending attitude of relationship lenders in the midst of the recent global financial crisis became much more severe if a transactional lender had extended an SBCS loan to a firm. These findings suggest that SBCS loans by a transactional lender are detrimental to a relationship lender's incentive to monitor SMEs and maintain relationships. In contrast, we do not find such detrimental effects for SBCS loans extended by a relationship lender.

This paper examines the effectiveness of Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) program set up during the financial turmoil following the failure of Lehman Brothers, in increasing credit availability and improving the ex-post performance of small businesses. In particular, using a unique firm-bank matched dataset, the paper examines whether lending relationships enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. It is found that the ECG program significantly improved credit availability for firms using the program. However, when it is a relationship lender (main bank) that extends an ECG loan, the increased availability is partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans by the same bank. Further, propensity score matching estimations show that the ex-post performance of firms that received ECG loans from the main bank deteriorates more than that of firms that received non-ECG loans. We do not find such loan "substitution" or performance "deterioration" effects when a non-main bank extends ECG loans. Our findings suggest that close firm-bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees.

In this paper, we investigate whether a natural selection mechanism works for firm exit. By using data of firms after a devastating earthquake, the Great Tohoku Earthquake, we examine the impact of firm efficiency on firm exit both inside and outside the earthquake-affected areas. We find evidence suggesting that more efficeint firms are less likely to exit both inside and outside the affected areas, which supports the natural selection mechanism. However, we also find that the mechanism is weaker for those firms whose main banks were damaged by the earthquake, which suggests that damage to banks weakens the natural selection mechanism. We also apply the same methodology to the case of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and again find that the natural selection mechanism works both inside and outside the affected areas. However, no significant impact of bank damage is found on the exit probability of a firm.