In a series of recent judgments, the Court of Justice has developed its approach to games of chance and online gambling. It has made it clear it will not use the EU free movement of services provisions to liberalize the internal market for games of chance. Member States are given a remarkable discretion to regulate gambling services. To this end, the Court applies its standard test for restrictions very flexibly, including even an interesting moral strand, on the basis of overriding reasons in the general interest and objectives of combating fraud and gambling addiction. The remaining scrutiny is essentially left to the national courts. As far as the award of licences is concerned, the requirements of transparency are applied more strictly, which may have a significant impact on market access. This contribution provides a thorough analysis of the EU framework now in place for games of chance. In addition, it proposes some general guidelines for the needed political, legislative activity at the EU level. Such activity could enhance both revenue and Member State control over gambling services, whilst allowing cooperation between them to achieve their individual objectives.

Kadi – Autonomy – Supremacy – EU legal order – Relationship between EU and UN – Terrorism – (National) Freezing Measures – Effects of annulment – Fundamental Rights – Right to effective legal protection – Right to property – Substantive versus formal hierarchy of norms – Comity – Relationship between Court of Justice and General Court – Bosphorus – Solange – Role and function of the Court of Justice

This contribution approaches the EU as a modified confederal system. It subsequently suggests that such modified confederal arrangements form a prima facie attractive model for transnational government more generally. To this end the EU is comparatively contrasted with the US Confederation, which was established directly after American independence, on the one hand and with its subsequent evolution into a federate state on the other—a comparison that demonstrates how the EU has combined a confederal foundation with some crucial federate reinforcements in its constitutional superstructure. Subsequently it is demonstrated how these modifications have addressed several of the classic weaknesses of the confederal form and may further help to open up the potential inherent in the confederal form for complementary transnational government more generally.

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The present study aims to extend research on the role of values for the perceived legitimacy of legal authorities by focusing on (1) supranational legal authorities and (2) a broad range of values. We examine how (alignment between) people’s personal values and their perception of the values of the European Union (EU) are related to perceived legitimacy of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the EU more broadly. Inspired by moral foundations theory, we distinguish between individualizing (i.e., “democracy”, “liberty”, and “fairness”) and binding values (i.e., “rule of law”, “respect for national authority”, and “respect for tradition”). An online survey was conducted in six EU member states (N = 1,136). A factor analysis confirmed a two-factor model (individualizing vs. binding values) for both personal values and perceived EU values. Four regression models were run for each of the value factors, including personal values, perceived EU values, and their interaction, on each of the outcomes (i.e., perceived CJEU and EU legitimacy). Perceived endorsement by the EU of both individualizing and binding values predicted higher legitimacy perceptions of the CJEU and EU. Furthermore, personal binding values had a negative effect on perceived EU legitimacy when participants perceived the EU to weakly support binding values, but a positive effect when the EU was perceived to strongly support binding values. The results suggest that value alignment plays an important role in perceived legitimacy of the CJEU and EU, and that better representing binding values might be a strategy to improve perceived EU legitimacy.