In the past, economic integration in Europe was largely compatible with the preservation of different national varieties of capitalism. While product market integration intensified competition, member states could build on and foster their respective comparative advantage. Today, this no longer unequivocally holds true. This article contends that a new, 'post-Ricardian' phase of European integration has emerged in which the Commission's and the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) attempts to promote economic integration systematically challenge the institutions of organised capitalism. It demonstrates this by discussing recent disputes over the Services Directive, the Takeover Directive, and company law. In the current phase of European integration, the Commission's and the ECJ's liberalisation attempts either transform the institutional foundations on which some of the member states' economic systems rely or they create political resistance to an extent that challenges the viability of the European project.This article starts from two separate but arguably linked observations. First, the aims and strategies of European integration have changed over the last 10-15 years. We will show that supranational actors no longer just eliminate discrimination against foreign companies. Going well beyond merely intensifying competition between national varieties of capitalism, recent directives put forward by the European Commission and decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) aim at transforming national institutions and bringing them in line with the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. Market-making no longer implies enforcement of non-discrimination but the abolition of potential institutional impediments to free markets. Hence, we speak of a new, 'post-Ricardian' phase of European integration that threatens the diversity of 'institutional foundations of comparative advantage ' (Hall and Soskice 2001).

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This article analyzes the social potential of regional integration processes by using the example of European integration+ Recent case law from the European Court of Justice has led some observers to argue that judicial decisions increasingly provide European politics with a " Polanyian" drive+ We test this claim by distinguishing three dimensions to European economic and social integration: market-restricting integration, market-enforcing integration, and the creation of a European area of nondiscrimination+ We also identify two forms of integration that have different speeds, scopes, and potentials: political integration and judicial integration+ The evidence shows that the EU has come closer to Hayek's vision of "interstate federalism" than is usually warranted because market-enforcing integration and European nondiscrimination policies have asymmetrically profited from "integration through law+" The opportunities for international courts to push ahead marketenforcing integration increase as the participants of regional integration processes become more diverse+ In such "Hayekian" constellations, individual rights are increasingly relocated to the central level, at the cost of subordinating the decentralized capacity for solidarity and interpersonal redistribution+ Above all, The Great Transformation tells of the conflict between the imperatives of a capitalist world economy and the pursuit of social welfare within nation-states+ Polanyi's account of the 1920s and 1930s analyzes the incompatibility of international capitalist arrangements with both democracy and the social reforms that had been won by the European working classes+ -Fred Block and Margaret R+ Somers, "Beyond the Economistic Fallacy"

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has received much attention in the recent EU-literature. The predominant view claims that the OMC is not only a new but also an effective policy-making instrument. This paper raises doubts about both claims by offering a comparison of soft law policy coordination in three international organizations. More specifically, this paper compares the European Employment Strategy -which was the first use of the OMC -to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the EU, the OECD Economic Surveys, and the IMF Article IV Consultations. Based on expert interviews, it seeks to demonstrate that these procedures are forms of multilateral surveillance that do not differ in kind. Such a comparative analysis of the OMC refutes claims to its novelty. Having compared the four procedures, a more general model of multilateral surveillance consisting of six elements is generated that facilitates further comparisons. This paper concludes that governments select voluntarist procedures mainly to secure their own competencies rather than to realize common goals. Effective problem-solving is therefore not necessarily the dominant objective of soft law. Terms of use: Documents in ZusammenfassungDie EU-Literatur der letzten Jahre hat der Offenen Methode der Koordinierung (OMC) viel Aufmerksamkeit zukommen lassen. Die vorherrschende Sichtweise behauptet, dass die OMC nicht nur ein neues, sondern auch ein effektives Instrument der Politikgestaltung sei. Dieser Aufsatz stellt beide Aussagen infrage, indem es einen Vergleich verschiedener soft law-Verfahren von drei internationalen Organisationen vorlegt. Im Einzelnen vergleicht dieses Papier die Europäische Beschäftigungsstrategie -mit der die OMC zuerst entstanden ist -mit den Grundzügen der Wirtschaftspolitik der EU, den Länderberichten der OECD sowie den Artikel-IV-Konsultationen des Internationalen Währungsfonds. Auf der Grundlage von Experteninterviews wird gezeigt, dass alle vier Verfahren multilateraler Überwachung zugeordnet werden können und kein kategorischer Unterschied zwischen ihnen besteht. Eine solche vergleichende Analyse widerlegt die angenommene Neuheit der OMC. Aufbauend auf dem Vergleich der vier Verfahren wird dann ein allgemeines Modell multilateraler Überwachung entwickelt, welches aus sechs Elementen besteht und zukünftige Studien erleichtern wird. Dieser Aufsatz schließt mit der Beobachtung, dass Regierungen voluntaristische Verfahren eher deshalb wählen, um ihre eigenen Kompeten...