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The concept of imagination has played a critical role in modern philosophy of religion: On the one hand it is crucial in order to understand what religion is about, and on the other hand it also opens up the possibility of a reductive approach to religion. This ambivalence comes to the fore especially in Hegel's foundation of philosophy of religion and its Wirkungsgeschichte. If Vorstellung is the form of religion, religion is to be interpreted as to its content, but if the content can be translated into a more adequate form, the speci c form of religion seems to be dispensable. The notion that religion is to be understood through the relation of Vorstellung and Begriff leads to both a non-reductive hermeneutics and a reductive criticism of religion. The critique of religion in 1840's rests on the notion of Vorstellung as the form of religion: Religion is only human imagination. The fact that both a non-reductive and a reductive approach to religion can take imagination as a key concept shows the ambivalence of the concept of imagination. This might suggest that we should look for other ways of understanding religion. If the concept of imagination is not only rich, but also ambivalent as to the very approach to religion, it seems to be too open. My suggestion however would be the opposite, namely that the concept of imagination catches the ambivalence of religion itself. To be more speci c, the suggestion is that in order to clarify the potential of the concept of imagination for a philosophy of religion we should take as our clue the question of subjectivity implied in the ambivalence of imagination. The rst step in order to understand the subjectivity of imagination will be to take into consideration the epistemological and anthropological significance of the concept of imagination. Before doing so let us have a rst sketch of the concept of imagination.

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