Electoral reforms offer an opportunity to incumbents to change the rules strategically, for their own benefits. From this aspect, the low number of studies addressing the effect of incumbents’ potential strategic manipulations of the electoral rules is striking. Most research analyses single reform cases, offering an overview of the context, the negotiations, and the outcome of the reform process. Comparative research on strategic electoral manipulation, however, is scarce, and almost non-existent on non-transitional settings or established democracies. To fill this gap, the present study examines whether European electoral reforms have served the short-term interest of the incumbent parties, analysing data in 30 European countries of all relevant electoral reforms carried out between 1960 and 2011. Interestingly, the results do not support the assumption that incumbent parties generally benefit from carrying out a reform. Moreover, it finds no substantial differences in this regard between major and minor reforms, and neither the age of democracies nor the timing of the reform has a significant effect on reformers’ gains. The paper discusses possible explanations for the negative effect found, and it concludes that, apart from promoting self-interest and the unpredictability of the reforms’ effects, the most probable causes are the reformers’ alternative goals.