A classical question in philosophy and psychology is if the sense of one's body influences how one visually perceives the world. Several theoreticians have suggested that our own body serves as a fundamental reference in visual perception of sizes and distances, although compelling experimental evidence for this hypothesis is lacking. In contrast, modern textbooks typically explain the perception of object size and distance by the combination of information from different visual cues. Here, we describe full body illusions in which subjects experience the ownership of a doll's body (80 cm or 30 cm) and a giant's body (400 cm) and use these as tools to demonstrate that the size of one's sensed own body directly influences the perception of object size and distance. These effects were quantified in ten separate experiments with complementary verbal, questionnaire, manual, walking, and physiological measures. When participants experienced the tiny body as their own, they perceived objects to be larger and farther away, and when they experienced the large-body illusion, they perceived objects to be smaller and nearer. Importantly, despite identical retinal input, this “body size effect” was greater when the participants experienced a sense of ownership of the artificial bodies compared to a control condition in which ownership was disrupted. These findings are fundamentally important as they suggest a causal relationship between the representations of body space and external space. Thus, our own body size affects how we perceive the world.

The dynamic integration of signals from different sensory modalities plays a key role in bodily self-perception. When visual information is used in the multisensory process of localizing and identifying one's own limbs, the sight of a body part often plays a dominant role. For example, it has repeatedly been shown that a viewed object must resemble a humanoid body part to permit illusory self-attribution of that object. Here, we report a perceptual illusion that challenges these assumptions by demonstrating that healthy (nonamputated) individuals can refer somatic sensations to a discrete volume of empty space and experience having an invisible hand. In 10 behavioral and one fMRI experiment, we characterized the perceptual rules and multisensory brain mechanisms that produced this "invisible hand illusion." Our behavioral results showed that the illusion depends on visuotactile-proprioceptive integration that obeys key spatial and temporal multisensory rules confined to near-personal space. The fMRI results associate the illusion experience with increased activity in regions related to the integration of multisensory body-related signals, most notably the bilateral ventral premotor, intraparietal, and cerebellar cortices. We further showed that a stronger feeling of having an invisible hand is associated with a higher degree of effective connectivity between the intraparietal and ventral premotor cortices. These findings demonstrate that the integration of temporally and spatially congruent multisensory signals in a premotor-intraparietal circuit is sufficient to redefine the spatial boundaries of the bodily self, even when visual information directly contradicts the presence of a physical limb at the location of the perceived illusory hand.

The perception of our limbs in space is built upon the integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals. Accumulating evidence suggests that these signals are combined in areas of premotor, parietal, and cerebellar cortices. However, it remains to be determined whether neuronal populations in these areas integrate hand signals according to basic temporal and spatial congruence principles of multisensory integration. Here, we developed a setup based on advanced 3D video technology that allowed us to manipulate the spatiotemporal relationships of visuotactile (VT) stimuli delivered on a healthy human participant's real hand during fMRI and investigate the ensuing neural and perceptual correlates. Our experiments revealed two novel findings. First, we found responses in premotor, parietal, and cerebellar regions that were dependent upon the spatial and temporal congruence of VT stimuli. This multisensory integration effect required a simultaneous match between the seen and felt postures of the hand, which suggests that congruent visuoproprioceptive signals from the upper limb are essential for successful VT integration. Second, we observed that multisensory conflicts significantly disrupted the default feeling of ownership of the seen real limb, as indexed by complementary subjective, psychophysiological, and BOLD measures. The degree to which self-attribution was impaired could be predicted from the attenuation of neural responses in key multisensory areas. These results elucidate the neural bases of the integration of multisensory hand signals according to basic spatiotemporal principles and demonstrate that the disintegration of these signals leads to "disownership" of the seen real hand.

Could it be possible that, in the not-so-distant future, we will be able to reshape the human body so as to have extra limbs? A third arm helping us out with the weekly shopping in the local grocery store, or an extra artificial limb assisting a paralysed person? Here we report a perceptual illusion in which a rubber right hand, placed beside the real hand in full view of the participant, is perceived as a supernumerary limb belonging to the participant's own body. This effect was supported by questionnaire data in conjunction with physiological evidence obtained from skin conductance responses when physically threatening either the rubber hand or the real one. In four well-controlled experiments, we demonstrate the minimal required conditions for the elicitation of this “supernumerary hand illusion”. In the fifth, and final experiment, we show that the illusion reported here is qualitatively different from the traditional rubber hand illusion as it is characterised by less disownership of the real hand and a stronger feeling of having two right hands. These results suggest that the artificial hand ‘borrows’ some of the multisensory processes that represent the real hand, leading to duplication of touch and ownership of two right arms. This work represents a major advance because it challenges the traditional view of the gross morphology of the human body as a fundamental constraint on what we can come to experience as our physical self, by showing that the body representation can easily be updated to incorporate an additional limb.

The senses of owning a body and being localized somewhere in space are two key components of human self-consciousness. Despite a wealth of neurophysiological and neuroimaging research on the representations of the spatial environment in the parietal and medial temporal cortices, the relationship between body ownership and self-location remains unexplored. To investigate this relationship, we used a multisensory out-of-body illusion to manipulate healthy participants' perceived self-location, head direction, and sense of body ownership during high-resolution fMRI. Activity patterns in the hippocampus and the posterior cingulate, retrosplenial, and intraparietal cortices reflected the sense of self-location, whereas the sense of body ownership was associated with premotor-intraparietal activity. The functional interplay between these two sets of areas was mediated by the posterior cingulate cortex. These results extend our understanding of the role of the posterior parietal and medial temporal cortices in spatial cognition by demonstrating that these areas not only are important for ecological behaviors, such as navigation and perspective taking, but also support the perceptual representation of the bodily self in space. Our results further suggest that the posterior cingulate cortex has a key role in integrating the neural representations of self-location and body ownership.