Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as a foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or nonuse, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as a major contributing factor to aircraft accidents. This paper reports the results of a field study of flight deck checklists and examines this seemingly mundane yet critical device from several perspectives: its functions, format, design, length, and usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. Certain sociotechnical factors, such as the airline "culture," cockpit resource management, and production pressures that influence the design and use of this device, are also discussed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided. Although the focus of this paper is on the air transport industry, most of the principles discussed apply equally well to other high-risk industries, such as maritime transportation, power production, weapons systems, space flight, and medical care.

This paper discusses a formal and rigorous approach to the analysis of operator interaction with machines. It addresses the acute problem of detecting design errors in human-machine interaction and focuses on verifying the correctness of the interaction in complex and automated control systems. The paper describes a systematic methodology for evaluating whether the interface provides the necessary information about the machine, so as to enable the operator to perform a specified task successfully and unambiguously. It also addresses the adequacy of the information, provided to the user via training material (e.g., user manual), about the machine's behavior. The essentials of the methodology, which can be automated and applied to the verification of large systems, are illustrated by several examples and through a case study of pilot's interaction with an autopilot onboard a modern commercial aircraft.Running head: human-automation interaction.

The procedure for generating the information content of user interfaces can be automated, and a software tool for its implementation has been developed. Potential application areas include adaptive interface systems and customized/personalized interfaces.

Checklists are a way of life on the flight deck, and, undoubtedly, are indispensable decision aids due to the volume of technical knowledge that must be readily accessible. The improper use of checklists, however, has been cited as a factor in several recent aircraft accidents (National Transportation Safety Board, 1988, 1989, 1990). Solutions to checklist problems, including the creation of electronic checklist systems which keep track of skipped items, may solve some problems but create others. In this paper, results from a simulation involving an engine shutdown are presented, and implications of the electronic checklist and “memory” checklist are discussed, in terms of potential errors and effects on decision making. Performance using two types of electronic checklist systems is compared with performance using the traditional paper checklist. Additionally, a “performing from memory” condition is compared with a “performing from the checklist” condition. Results suggest that making checklist procedures more automatic, either by asking crews to accomplish steps from memory, or by checklists that encourage crews to rely on system state as indicated by the checklist, rather than as indicated by the system itself, will discourage information gathering, and may lead to dangerous operational errors.

In complex human-machine systems, successful operations depend on a elaborate set of procedures which are specified by the operational management of the organization. These procedures indicate to the human operator (in this case the pilot) the manner in which operational management intends to have various tasks performed. The intent is to provide guidance to the pilots and to ensure a safe, logical, efficient, and predictable (standardized) means of carrying out the objectives of the job. However, procedures can become a hodge-podge. Inconsistent or illogical procedures may lead to non-compliance by operators. Based on a field study with three major airlines, the authors propose a model for procedure development which we call "The Four P's:" philosophy, policies, procedures, and practices. The various factors, both external and internal to the cockpit, that must be considered for procedure design are presented. In particular, the paper addresses the development of procedures for automated cockpits-a decade-long, and highly controversial issue in commercial aviation. Although this paper is based on airline operations, we believe that the principles discussed are also applicable to other highrisk supervisory control systems, such as space flight, manufacturing process control, nuclear power production, and military operations.