Demand uncertainty obliges all participants through a supply chain to make decisions under uncertainty. These decisions extend across price, investment, production, and inventory quantities. We take account of competition between two supply chains under demand uncertainty. These chains internally are involved in vertical pricing competition; however, they externally participate in horizontal pricing and service level competitions by offering a singletype product to the market. Since firms may have various attitudes against demand uncertainty and its related risks, different risk structures for competitive supply chains are considered. We assume that risk-averse firms are able to decrease demand uncertainty by information gathered from market research. For risk-averse participants in a chain, market research investment is an appropriate ground for vertical coordination, which diminishes risk through a supply chain. Optimal strategies based on game theory are obtained for different risk structures; furthermore, for each structure the effects of risk sensitivity as well as market research efficiency on these optimal strategies are investigated. Finally, we propose two scenarios for information sharing between risk-averse participants.
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