We investigate the justifications provided by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) when sanctioning audit firms and individual auditors, as disclosed in the publicly released Settled Disciplinary Orders (SDOs). Employing responsive regulation theory, we seek to gain an understanding of violating behaviors by audit firms and individual auditors that attract regulatory responses ranging in nature from persuasive to punitive sanctions. Using 298 SDOs issued by the PCAOB from 2005 to 2020, we find that the frequency and severity of PCAOB sanctions at the firm level are positively associated with auditing standards violations, independence issues, and reckless behavior. At the individual auditor level, integrity violations and reckless behavior are positively associated with the frequency and severity of PCAOB sanctions. Our findings indicate that significantly higher financial penalties for individual auditors (audit firms) arise from manipulation of audit evidence (quality control criticisms). Further, the PCAOB financially penalizes Big 4-affiliated auditors and firms significantly more than their non-Big 4 counterparts. Other factors such as multiple individuals being implicated in an SDO and whether a firm and individual(s) are both implicated in the SDO are important considerations in sanction(s) imposed by the PCAOB. Overall, our findings suggest that the PCAOB adopts a responsive enforcement strategy when monitoring the auditors in their ethical and audit compliance efforts.

Although the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections commenced in 2003, few studies have analyzed the recurring nature of audit deficiencies both within and across U.S. and non-U.S. firms. This study investigates longitudinal trends in PCAOB Part I audit deficiencies and compares these deficiencies between initial and subsequent inspections. We classify the audit deficiencies contained in the inspection reports into three categories relating to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), and Internal Controls over Financial Reporting (ICFR). Using 1,551 inspections conducted over the period 2003–2017, we find that 67% of Part I audit deficiencies in the related reports pertain to GAAP and that triennially inspected audit firms have the highest occurrence of these deficiencies. On average, 22% of audit deficiencies relate to GAAS, with the highest incidence of these deficiencies attributable to annually inspected audit firms. Although ICFR has the least audit deficiencies (11%), we find a significant increase from 2009. We find no significant differences in the mean number of GAAP, GAAS, and ICFR audit deficiencies between first- and second-round inspections. However, we find a significant increase in the mean number of ICFR audit deficiencies between the third- to fifth-round inspections. The audit areas of “revenue recognition,”“inventory,” and “fair value measurements” (i.e., those requiring significant auditor judgment) are the most frequent audit deficiencies identified by the PCAOB. This study provides insights into the frequency and nature of audit deficiencies to stakeholders such as investors, auditors, audit committees, and users of financial statements.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has cited investors as the main stakeholder group requesting greater disclosure about the involvement of auditors other than the group auditor. This study investigates the following: 1) whether (any) differences in investor perceived earnings quality of group audits are associated with the component auditor belonging to the same network as the group auditor and; 2) whether this association is affected by the location of the client. We find that earnings informativeness is lower for group audits conducted by audit firms related by a global network. However, this finding is pertinent only to non‐US‐domiciled companies. We also find that since the escalation of PCAOB scrutiny, the earnings informativeness of non‐U.S. companies has increased.

| 4221 3. We believe that the authority may lead to confusion as to the applicability of the standard in that it will likely contribute to a disconnect between what is perceived to be a less complex entity and entities scoped into the standard. We recommend that the IAASB consider placing less emphasis on global prohibitions and place more emphasis on qualitative characteristics and jurisdictional discretion. (Question 3b) 4. We do not believe that the authority itself informs audit report users of the scope of the proposed standard and recommend that this be addressed by other means (e.g., education). (Question 3d) 5. We believe that the role of legislative and regulative authorities is appropriate. (Question 3e) 6. We do not agree with the use of specific prohibitions and believe that greater emphasis should be placed on jurisdictional discretion, and a greater focus be placed on principlesbased qualitative criteria. (Question 4a) 7. We broadly agree with the qualitative characteristics specified, but recommend, following comments in response to other questions, that the criteria be expanded to include circumstances for which the auditor needs to refer to the full suite of standards and the need to use a component auditor. (Question 4b) 8. We suggest that the approach employed in developing the ED-ISA for LCE is problematic in that it is based on the material contained in the extant suite of standards. This approach gives rise to the potential for key issues not included in the extant suite of standards, but critical to the achievement of reasonable assurance in an audit of less complex entities, being omitted from the standalone standard. (Question 7a) 9. We believe that the material on professional scepticism, relevant ethical requirements and quality management is incomplete and does not fully reflect the unique circumstances in which an audit of a less complex entity is undertaken. (Question 7c) 10. We believe that Parts 1, 3 and 6 of ED-ISA for LCE can be improved. We also believe that ISA610 (Using the work of an Internal Auditor) should not be excluded from the standard. (Question 9) 11. We broadly agree with the approach taken with regard to auditor reporting in that specific reference is made to the auditing standard with which the auditor's opinion is formed. We caution, however, that an unintended consequence may be that users incorrectly infer meaning from the use of the standalone standard and may perceive that a lower level of assurance is provided. We suggest that a broad education program would be necessary to address this potential unintended consequence. (Question 10a) 12. We agree with the approach to include a specified format and content of an Auditor's Report as a requirement. (Question 10b) 13. We do not believe that ED-ISA for LCE in its current form will meet the needs of stakeholders. We do not, however, discount the possibility of a revised standalone standard achieving the goal of meeting current challenges associated with audits of less complex entities. (Question 17b) 14. We bel...

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