Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems are complex communication and locational technologies comprising multiple independent components. DAA technologies support communications between ground-based and space-based operations with aircraft. Both manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) rely on DAA communication and location technologies for safe flight operations. We examined the occurrence and duration of communication losses between radar and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) systems with aircraft operating in proximate airspace using data collected during actual flight operations. Our objectives were to identify the number and duration of communication losses for both radar and ADS-B systems that occurred within a discrete time period. We also investigated whether other unique communication behavior and anomalies were occurring, such as reported elevation deviations. We found that loss of communication with both radar and ADS-B systems does occur, with variation in the length of communication losses. We also discovered that other unexpected behaviors were occurring with communications. Although our data were gathered from manned aircraft, there are also implications for UAS that are operating within active airspaces. We are unaware of any previously published work on occurrence and duration of communication losses between radar and ADS-B systems.
An analysis of the performance of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data received from the Grand Forks, North Dakota International Airport was carried out in this study. The purpose was to understand the vulnerabilities of the universal access transceiver (UAT) ADS-B system and recognize the effects on present and future air traffic control (ATC) operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated all the general aviation aircraft to be equipped with ADS-B. The aircraft flying within United States and below the transition altitude (18,000 feet) are more likely to install a UAT ADS-B. At present, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and autonomous air traffic control (ATC) towers are being integrated into the aviation industry and UAT ADS-B is a basic sensor for both class 1 and class 2 detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems. As a fundamental component of future surveillance systems, the anomalies and vulnerabilities of the ADS-B system need to be identified to enable a fully-utilized airspace with enhanced situational awareness. The data received was archived in GDL-90 format, which was parsed into readable data. The anomaly detection of ADS-B messages was based on the FAA ADS-B performance assessment report. The data investigation revealed ADS-B message suffered from different anomalies including dropout, missing payload, data jump, low confidence data, and altitude discrepancy. Among those studied, the most severe was dropout and 32.49% of messages suffered from this anomaly. Dropout is an incident where ADS-B failed to update within a specified rate. Considering the potential danger being imposed, an in-depth analysis was carried out to characterize message dropout. Three flight parameters were selected to investigate their effect on dropout. Statistical analysis was carried out and the Friedman Statistical Test identified that altitude affected dropout more than any other flight parameter.
The airworthiness certification of aerospace cyber-physical systems traditionally relies on the probabilistic safety assessment as a standard engineering methodology to quantify the potential risks associated with faults in system components. This paper presents and discusses the probabilistic safety assessment of detect and avoid (DAA) systems relying on multiple cooperative and non-cooperative tracking technologies to identify the risk of collision of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) with other flight vehicles. In particular, fault tree analysis (FTA) is utilized to measure the overall system unavailability for each basic component failure. Considering the inter-dependencies of navigation and surveillance systems, the common cause failure (CCF)-beta model is applied to calculate the system risk associated with common failures. Additionally, an importance analysis is conducted to quantify the safety measures and identify the most significant component failures. Results indicate that the failure in traffic detection by cooperative surveillance systems contribute more to the overall DAA system functionality and that the probability of failure for ownship locatability in cooperative surveillance is greater than its traffic detection function. Although all the sensors individually yield 99.9% operational availability, the implementation of adequate multi-sensor DAA system relying on both cooperative and non-cooperative technologies is shown to be necessary to achieve the desired levels of safety in all possible encounters. These results strongly support the adoption of a unified analytical framework for cooperative/non-cooperative UAS DAA and elicits an evolution of the current certification framework to properly account for artificial intelligence and machine-learning based systems.
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