In the Netherlands disaster and crisis management is a local responsibility. The official point of view is that this asks for central controlled collaboration. Authority to enforce this is legally given to the mayor and a dedicated operational leader. Practice however shows that during the acute phase of a disaster or crisis that central controlled coordination cannot be achieved. In this article it is shown that control over the collaboration in the acute phase of a disaster or crisis can only be accomplished in an indirect way via controlled collaboration in the preparatory phase. Practice however shows that in the preparatory phase collaboration of organizations involved in disaster or crisis management is not enforced but based on voluntary actions of these organizations.''A lack of understanding of emergency management is likely one reason why officials have suggested that the nation's response to catastrophic disasters needs a stronger command-and-control system that might be best handled by the military'' (Waugh & Streib, 2006).

Scientists have extensively debated the effectiveness of different emer gency response management models, with a particular focus on the "command and control" versus "coordination" models. This debate, which focuses on centra lized coordination at the tactical and strategic levels, assumes that the activity of frontline units within and between response organizations must be aligned and that it is possible to exercise control over frontline units. In this article, we discuss these assumptions and argue that researchers over estimate the degree to which frontline units can and should be centrally coordinated during the acute phase of emergency situations. Instead, we provide a mechanism in which coordination naturally emerges from the task at hand when frontline units follow a few simple decision rules. In addition, two managerial intervention strategies are presented that only may work in specific situations when frontline units are likely to misin terpret the environment in which they operate.

By and large, scientists agreed on what should be the output of a good command and information system in the acute phase of a disaster. The public needs fast and accurate information and fast ‘meaning‐making’ if they are to be as self‐reliant as possible and to be in the best possible position to cope with the shock of the disaster. Operational units need decentralized command and sometimes fast strategic decision‐making. Despite this, classical command and information systems such as the three‐tier system required by law in the Netherlands fail to deliver in this regard. We sketch an analytical framework which when applied to the Dutch system predicts its failure. We also present a different command and information system, already used in the Drenthe Safety Region, which satisfies the analytical framework. Early experience with the Drenthe system shows the potential of the new system but also shows that no system is better than the people in it.

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