The aim of this work is to analyse the influence of sociocultural factors on corruption levels. Taking as starting point Husted (J Int Bus Studies 30:339-359, 1999) and Graeff (In: Lambsdorff J, Taube M, Schramm M (eds) The new institutional economics of corruption. Routledge, London, 2005) proposals, we consider both the interrelation between cultural dimensions and the diverse expressions of social capital with corruption. According to our results, the universalistic trust (linking and bridging social capital) constitutes a positive social capital that is negatively linked to corruption. In contrast, the particularistic levels of trust (bonding) can constitute a negative social capital directly related to corruption levels. Furthermore, cultures which are favourable to the legitimation of dependency relations and the formation of closed particularistic groups (power-distance and community factors) create a breeding ground for the development of these amoral rent-seeking structures.

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Social capital is a controversial concept, which is used in economics as a generic form of pro-sociality and a simple means to introduce the social context into mainstream approaches. However, the accepted view underestimates social conflict and does not properly characterise social capital as an asset. When considering these issues, a different face of social capital emerges, one that can be associated with closure and privilege maintenance. This paper studies how access to and the extraction of social network resources depend on the social structure. By analysing data from a survey that included a position and a resource generator, we find that for the case of Spanish society, people endowed with high levels of economic and human capital enjoy improved accessibility and networks with a high prevalence of instrumental relations. There is essential inequality in the endowment of social capital, which augments economic inequality. When inequality is socially embedded, traditional redistributive policies may have limited effectiveness.

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The objective of this article is to analyse the determinants of preferences for redistribution in Spain both at an aggregate and regional level. Using country level data, we put to the test the Alesina and Angeletos' (2005) hypothesis, the strong and positive relationship between the 'belief that luck determines income' and the support for redistributive policies. As an innovative contribution, we contrast this hypothesis using a set of panel data models with regional and time fixed effects. Our main finding is the existence of a structural change in preferences formation for redistribution in Spain between 1995 and 2007. Furthermore, the empirical results provide some evidence suggesting that (1) the belief that society is unfair have a moderate effect on the individuals' preferences for redistribution and (2) regional beliefs in Spanish regions are not equally important when determining demand for redistribution.