The need to achieve stability and security in Europe has been a core motivation for European Union actors in their decision in favour of enlargement, calling for new measures to advance the enlargement process. EU leaders have often justified changes to the existing enlargement strategy by making reference to threats to security in Europe and by claiming that eastern enlargement could be the way to attain peace and security in Europe. Never has EU enlargement been so frequently connected with security debates. The overall effect of security concerns on the enlargement process, however, has not been adequately analysed in previous studies of EU enlargement; enlargement policy has largely been explained from economic and commercial viewpoints. This article explores the role of security concerns in EU enlargement -'security' that does not necessarily come in the military form, but in what I refer to as a 'speech act', drawing on insights from the Copenhagen School of security studies. The article comprises (1) a conceptual framework to consider how 'security' as 'speech act' (or the 'securitization' approach) can explain the enlargement process, (2) three case studies of security influences in the context of EU enlargement, and (3) conclusions on when and how security has mattered in the EU enlargement process.

This paper considers how the three sets of bilateral relations, between the European Union (EU) and Japan, the EU and Turkey, and Turkey and Japan, have developed (or been underdeveloped) and how the three have failed to form a strategic triangle that could potentially be beneficial for dealing with regional and international problems more efficiently. One of the main arguments is that, although all three sides of this triangle have developed significant economic relationships, their political relationships are less consolidated. Such a phenomenon is largely illustrated by the following three elements of this triangle: a deteriorated relationship between the EU and Turkey, an underutilised relationship between Japan and the EU, and an extant relationship between Japan and Turkey. This paper analyses the elements that have impeded or continue to hinder constructive political dialogue. It concludes that the potential for improvement in the three sets of bilateral relations is slight, in the short term, with Japan, in particular, finding it increasingly difficult to strike a good balance between developing the relationship with the EU while maintaining historical ties with Turkey.

No abstract

Japan and the Visegrád Group (V4) have enjoyed stable and problem-free relations. However, Japan’s engagement with the V4 countries has lacked dynamism and robustness in areas such as Japan’s foreign direct investment in the V4 countries and visits by highranking Japanese officials to V4. This paper discusses the asymmetric relations between Japan and V4 from the Japanese perspective, focusing mainly on how and why Japan failed to place more emphasis on strengthening its relations with the V4 countries. Three backgrounds for this situation are identified: the US- and China-centric nature of Japan’s foreign policy, Japan’s large-country focus in its outlook and policies concerning Europe, and Japan’s somewhat outdated self-image as a significant donor and supporter of the Central and Eastern European countries.

No abstract