We explore time trends in the labor force participation of veterans and non-veterans and investigate whether they are consistent with a rising role for the Department of Veterans Affairs' Disability Compensation (DC) program, which pays benefits to veterans with service-connected disabilities and has grown rapidly since 2000. Using 35 years of March CPS data, we find that veterans' labor force participation declined over time in a way that coincides closely with DC growth and that veterans have become more sensitive to economic shocks. Our findings suggest that DC program growth has contributed to recent declines in veterans' labor force participation.

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In the US states administer their own unemployment insurance programs, and cross-state variation leads to significant differences in tax costs faced by employers in different states. Leveraging the existing locations of multi-state manufacturing firms for identification, I find that high tax plants were more likely to exit during economic downturns and less likely to hire during the recovery. Moving a plant's outside option from a high tax state to a low tax state would increase likelihood of exit by 20% during the Great Recession. This suggests that decentralized administration of UI may contribute to jobless recoveries and additional misallocation.

The authors thank Erzo F. P. Luttmer, Elizabeth Bass, Heidi Golding, and seminar participants at the ASSA meetings, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and Stanford University for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Compensation (DC) program provides disability benefits to nearly one in five military veterans in the US and its annual expenditures exceed $60 billion. We examine how the receipt of DC benefits affects the employment decisions of older veterans. We make use of variation in program eligibility resulting from a 2001 policy change that increased access to the program for Vietnam veterans who served with "boots on the ground" in the Vietnam theater but not for other veterans of that same era. We find that the policy-induced increase in program enrollment decreased labor force participation and induced a substantially larger switch from wage employment to self-employment. This latter finding suggests that an exogenous increase in income spurred many older veterans to start their own businesses. Additionally, we estimate that one in four veterans who entered the DC program due to this policy change left the labor force, estimates in the same range as those from recent studies of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program.