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This study adopts a resource-based view to explain the complementary role of the corporate structure in the value creation of green supply chain management (GSCM) practices. Using 8-year panel data collected from 317 US international manufacturers, we analyze the influence of GSCM practices on corporate financial performance (CFP) and the mediating role of a certified environmental management system (EMS) in this relationship. We show that GSCM practices have a positive impact on accounting-based financial performance, meaning, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). In contrast, firms that implement GSCM practices and a certified EMS simultaneously achieve a higher market valuation in terms of Tobin's Q in addition to a higher ROA and ROE in the following year. Our study demonstrates that, through their synergistic combination with a firm's complementary EMS, utilizing GSCM practices can result in intangible assets as sources of long-term financial benefits. Our results have several theoretical and managerial implications. They also address the limitations of the prior use of varying survey-based items for internal and external GSCM practices and add nuance to the existing GSCM practices in the literature.corporate financial performance (CFP), environmental management system (EMS), green supply chain management (GSCM) practices, resource-based theory, value creation | INTRODUCTIONAccording to the "WMO Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2020" (World Meteorological Organization, 2020), the past 6 years (2015-2020) were the warmest on record. It is widely recognized that the accelerating pace of global warming is primarily caused by increased levels of greenhouse-gas emissions, to which firms are pivotal contributors. Increasing pressures from a broad range of stakeholders, including national and international governments, nongovernmental organizations, media, lobbyists, suppliers, and customers, are pushing firms to embed sustainability into their business practices to tackle climate change. Using green supply chain management (GSCM) practices, which integrate environmental management with supply chain management, has become a core strategy for Abbreviations: CFP, corporate financial performance; CSR, corporate social responsibility; EMS, environmental management system; GHRM, green human resource management; GSCM, green supply chain management; ROA, return on assets; ROE, return on equity; VIFs, variance inflation factors.

Although an efficient design of franchise contracts requires from the franchisor to choose a bundle of contractual restraints as safeguarding and control mechanism, previous research has not explored the antecedents of contractual restraints as a bundle of contractual clauses. To address this gap, the aim of this study is to explain the determinants of the most important contractual restraints (i.e., exclusive dealing, exclusive territory, tying, resale price maintenance, call option, leasing, alienation, and noncompetition clauses), using transaction cost and relational governance reasoning. The regression results based on primary data from German and Swiss franchise systems provide support of hypotheses. | INTRODUCTIONAdvantages of hierarchical control do not only result from integration or ownership but also from firms' ability to exercise decision control in exchange relationships (Heide, 1994;Stump & Heide, 1996;Weitz & Jap, 1995). According to Stinchcombe (1985), decision control as formal authority can be exercised between firms through contractual clauses. In franchising, formal authority in contracts refers to the clauses that restrain franchisees' activities in some desired manner (Lafontaine & Slade, 2014). For instance, by specifying geographical territories which define franchisees' local market boundaries, the franchisor can prevent horizontal externalities (Lafontaine & Slade, 2014); or by authorizing franchisees to acquire raw materials from the appointed suppliers and to sell only brand-related products, the franchisor can influence the set and quality of products available to consumers (Marvel, 1982). Therefore, the efficient allocation of such restraints will influence the performance of franchise systems (Dutta, Heide, & Bergen, 1999).With few exceptions, previous studies have not analyzed contractual restraints in networks (Dutta et al., 1999;Heide, 1994;Michael, 2000b). In franchising, scholars treat franchise contractual clauses either dichotomously (e.g., Dutta et al., 1999;Michael, 2000b;Schmidt, 1994) In this paper, we aim to empirically examine the antecedents of using contractual restraints from a bundle of the most important clauses in franchise contracts. More specifically, the study investigates the determinants of the franchisor's choice of contractual restraints of exclusive territory, exclusive dealing, tying and noncompetition arrangements, resale price maintenance, lease control, real option, and alienation rights (Dnes, 1993;Lafontaine & Slade, 2014;Schmidt, 1994;Windsperger, 2002). We argue that the franchisor's use of contractual restraints depends on transaction costs and relational variables, such as environmental uncertainty and trust. Transaction cost scholars have dominantly focused on explaining how business uncertainties could lead to more decision control (Williamson, 1975;Williamson, 1985;Williamson, 1991;Zhao, Luo, & Suh, 2004). However, they have not considered the role of relational aspects in interorganizational partnerships (Dyer & Singh, 1998;Poppo & Zenger,...