Territorial self‐determination and global distributive justice seem to be at loggerheads. Cosmopolitans hold that institutions such as states can be justified only derivatively on global justice. But ‘self‐determinists’ insist that territorial self‐determination is independently significant. The current article hypothesizes that the core disagreement is not over the justification of global resource egalitarianism, but rather over the conception of resources per se. The article presents three conceptions of resources – the familiar ‘natural resources’ conception, Tim Hayward's ‘physical’ conception and Ronald Dworkin's ‘constructivist’ conception – and argues that, particularly when appended to egalitarian global distribution principles, each is importantly flawed. The article then presents and defends an ‘intentional’ conception of resources as fungible means. This account treats resources as intentional kinds rather than natural kinds. As such, they can be identified only after discerning whose intentional states are decisive in a given case. Discerning that is the role of a theory of territorial rights. A resource is such when the morally legitimate territorial right‐holder treats it as a fungible means. The theory of territorial rights is universal, and the resource distribution principle is morally cosmopolitan; but the determination of what counts as a resource is claimant‐relative, respecting self‐determination. The article then works out implications for global justice, with special attention to the global environment and through comparisons with Hayward's eco‐space egalitarianism. The result is a sketch of a unified theory of global resource justice, giving due weight to both cosmopolitan egalitarianism and to territorial self‐determination.

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What is it that makes someone a parent? Many writers--call them 'monists'--claim that parenthood is grounded solely in one essential feature that is both necessary and sufficient for someone's being a parent. We reject not only monism but also 'necessity' views, in which some specific feature is necessary but not also sufficient for parenthood. Our argument supports what we call 'pluralism', the view that any one of several kinds of relationship is sufficient for parenthood. We begin by challenging monistic versions of gestationalism, the view that gestation uniquely grounds parenthood. Monistic and necessity gestationalism are implausible. First, we raise the 'paternity problem'--necessity gestationalists lack an adequate account of how men become fathers. Second, the positive arguments that necessity gestationalists give are not compelling. However, although gestation may not be a necessary condition for parenthood, there is not good reason to think that it is sufficient. After further rebutting an 'intentionalist' account of parenthood, in which having and acting on intentions to procreate and rear is necessary for parenthood, we end by sketching a pluralistic picture of the nature of parenthood, rooted in causation, on which gestation, direct genetic derivation, extended custody, and even, sometimes, intentions, may be individually sufficient for parenthood.

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