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How does the rising 'regulatory welfare state' address social policy concerns in pension markets? This study examines this question by comparing the regulatory responses to high charges paid by low-income workers in pension markets in the UK and Israel. In the UK, with the recognition that the market would not cater to low-income workers, the regulatory response was the creation of a publicly operated low-cost pension fund (NEST), a 'public option' within the market. This allowed low-income workers access to a low level of charges, previously reserved for high-income and organised workers. In Israel, regulation sought to empower consumers, while providing minimal social protection by capping pension charges at a relatively high level, thereby leaving most of the responsibility for reducing the charges with the individual saver. By comparing these two cases, the article develops an analytical framework for the study of the regulatory welfare state, making two contributions. First, it highlights different types of regulatory citizenship: minimal regulatory social protection as opposed to a more egalitarian approach. Second, it identifies an overlooked regulatory welfare state strategy: creating 'public option' arrangements, whereby a state-run (but not funded) service operates within the market.

Hybridity has become a central characteristic of accountability in current public governance, particularly in the realm of social services. Contemporary service delivery systems are increasingly defined by the mixing and layering of accountability regimes with actors (both public and private) operating in multiple, overlapping, and at times conflicting accountability relations. The symposium aims to advance our understanding of this still under-research area by theorizing and empirically investigating hybrid arrangements of accountability. In this introductory article, we suggest a definition for what hybridity means in the context of accountability and explore the origins and development of hybrid accountability in current welfare institutions. We then present the contribution of the symposium papers against the background of the existing scholarly debate. We conclude by reflecting on the challenges of studying hybrid accountability and suggesting future lines of research in this field.

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This article explores the democratic values underlying public services when they are outsourced. Building on Rosenbloom and Piotrowski's (2005a, 2005b) framework, we examine whether and how administrative law norms – that serve as central democratic governance and accountability mechanisms in the administrative state – are extended to the new (private) frontline service providers. Through a study of the regulation of the privatized welfare‐to‐work programme in Wisconsin, we find that new forms of administrative law are evolving in third‐party government. These forms differ from administrative law as it usually applies to public agencies in several important aspects. The findings highlight the active role of legislative and administrative mechanisms in the promotion of these new forms of administrative law; and they shed light on the transformations that administrative law norms undergo in the age of third‐party government.