Purpose This paper aims to explore whether fair value Levels 1 and 2 measurements are more value relevant than Level 3 fair value measurements in a less-active market. Specifically, this research addresses two objectives. Firstly, it examines the value relevance of fair value measures for each disclosure level of fair value. Secondly, it assesses the impact of corporate governance on the value relevance of less observable fair value disclosures (Levels 2 and 3). Design/methodology/approach Drawing insights from agency theorising, this research adopts a quantitative approach (regression analysis) that investigates data from a less active financial market (South Africa). Findings Contrary to agency theory suppositions, the results show that investors in a less active market value management inputs more than market (more transparent) information. The authors also observe that investors pay limited interest to corporate governance structures when pricing fair value measurement, implying that they rely on factors beyond corporate governance mechanisms. Originality/value The authors’ findings offer useful evidence to standard setters and preparers of financial information. While the International Accounting Standard Board suggests that investors value transparent financial information, the data shows that investors in less-active markets value management’s inputs more than those of the market.