This article provides a comprehensive framework to explain why Turkey has adopted a pro-active diaspora agenda since the early 2000s. It shows that Turkey's diaspora policy is the result of an amalgamation of domestic, transnational, and international factors: Domestically, the AKP's rise to power resulted in drastic economic and political reforms and the promotion of a new identity based on neo-Ottomanism and Sunni-Muslim nationalism. These developments have transformed Turkey's state-diaspora relations. The 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 failed coup attempt also played a role. Transnationally, Turkish expatriates' growing socioeconomic and political clout in their host countries, as evidenced by the mushrooming of political parties founded by Turks in Europe, has urged Turkey to reconsider the efficacy of its diaspora as a source of influence abroad as well as a noteworthy electorate in national elections. Various international events have also shaped Turkey's new diaspora agenda, including Turkey's increasing bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU since the early 2000s, particularly after the European refugee crisis, and the rise of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 era. I suggest that domestic factors have played the most significant role in shaping Turkey's diaspora agenda. I examine the domestic dimension both as an independent factor and also in relation to transnational and international factors. The configuration of a new political elite has changed the ways in which Turkey interacts with its transnational diaspora and perceives its international position vis-à-vis European countries. The findings of the article draw on official statements and documents, semistructured in-depth interviews conducted with Turkish officials, the Euro-Turks Barometer Survey, and news sources.

This article discusses how Turkish

The existing literature on state-diaspora relations, primarily in the MENA, has mostly focused on how and why home states engage their diasporas, rather than with what consequences. This article investigates how different groups within the diaspora community are affected by the homeland's multi-tiered diaspora engagement policy. I argue that sending states influence select immigrant organizations' mobilization by empowering them in two key ways: They instil selfconfidence and collective identity in organization leaders and provide them with capacity-development and know-how support. Yet such differential treatment may become a source of suspicion in host states and cause resentment among the disregarded diaspora groups. The findings draw from extensive fieldwork conducted in France, Germany, and Turkey between 2013 and 2019 and original data derived from interviews, official documents, and news sources.

This article focuses on the relationship between Alevis and the Turkish and German states. It does so by examining the Turkish Alevi Opening (2009–2010) and the German Islam Conference (2006–present), two unprecedented official platforms aimed at improving Alevis’ political participation. The study asks why such state-sponsored initiatives came into existence in Turkey and Germany, and why the German Islam Conference has proven more successful from the perspective of Alevis. It argues that even though the diffusion of EU norms and pressure from transnational advocacy networks have increased awareness regarding the Alevi issue, domestic factors have been more salient in the emergence and outcome of these initiatives in both countries.

Turkey has seen a surge in populist nationalism over the last decade. How this has played out in transnational space through overseas Turkish citizens' voting behaviour remains understudied, however. This article takes up this question, focusing on how the populist-nationalist appeals of the ruling AKP have been received by Turkish citizens in Europe. Specifically, it asks why such appeals have resonated highly with voters in some host countries but not in others. The study suggests that expatriates from Turkey facing more discrimination are more likely to be wooed by populist-nationalist discourse from the homeland. The findings draw on official statements and speeches, Turkish electoral data, the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, newspaper articles, and secondary sources.