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In this paper, we examine the impact of preparer-side XBRL filing decisions on the accuracy and speed of financial disclosures. Specifically, we use the choice between in-house and outsourced preparation of XBRL filings to examine the impact of the decisions on financial disclosures. Using annual and quarterly SEC filings in XBRL format, we test the accuracy and speed of the filings by comparing the number of amendments and reporting delays of the filings that are prepared in-house relative to those prepared by a third party. Our results indicate that outsourcing XBRL filings increases reporting accuracy but does not affect speed. Additionally, several firm-specific characteristics, including the complexity of XBRL filings, have an impact on the accuracy and speed of XBRL filings.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate how compensation committee structure or characteristic impacts say on pay (SOP) voting dissent and the impact of SOP dissent on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover. Design/methodology/approach The authors use corporate governance and SOP data to test the relationships amongst variables. Additional analysis is performed using one-to-one propensity-score matched samples. Findings The authors find that firm-years with at least a female member present on the compensation committee are associated with lower SOP dissent. The authors find mixed results of the impact of SOP dissent on CEO turnover. Practical implications This paper suggests that diversity on the compensation committee, particularly the presence of at least a female member on the committee, serves as an important determinant of SOP voting outcome in the USA. The paper provides policymakers and practitioners with insights into factors influencing SOP voting outcomes and implications of SOP dissent for firms. Originality/value The findings of this paper contribute to the corporate governance literature by enhancing the understanding of the role of the compensation committee as it relates to SOP dissent and effect of SOP dissent on CEO turnover.

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Say-on-pay empowers shareholders by mandating advisory voting on executive compensation during annual meetings. Extant literature maintains that the degree of effectiveness of SOP remains unclear. Using shareholder voting data from 2011 to 2015, we estimate regression models, and from our analysis, we find improved subsequent firm performance for higher SOP voting dissent observations. Furthermore, we find a positive association between SOP dissent vote and risk-taking. The findings suggest that managers take seriously the negative outcomes of SOP, especially the higher SOP voting dissent. This study contributes to the growing research on SOP votes, as it highlights some impact of SOP voting.