This research examines the determinants of firms" capital structure introducing a behavioral perspective that has received little attention in corporate finance literature. After discussing the theoretical linking between firm capital structure choice and the CEO"s attitude and behavior, we are showing on empirical grounds the relationship between the manager"s behavior toward the capital structure preferences and his cognitive commitment level. The article explains that the main cause of capital structure choice is CEO commitment level. We introduce an approach based on Decision Tree Analysis technique with a series of semi-directive interviews. The originality of this research is guaranteed since it traits the behavioral corporate policy choice in emergent markets. In the best of knowledge this is the first study in the Tunisian context that explores such area of research. Results show that psychological dimension introduced in the capital structure analysis has enriched the Pecking Order Theory (POT) and the Static Trade Off Theory (STT) CEO (CEO affective commitment) prefer to finance their projects primarily through internal capital, by debt in the second hand and finally by equity.

This paper assumes that managers, investors, or both behave irrationally. In addition, even though scholars have investigated behavioral irrationality from three angles, investor sentiment, investor biases and managerial biases, we focus on the relationship between one of the managerial biases, overconfidence and dividend policy. Previous research investigating the relationship between overconfidence and financial decisions has studied investment, financing decisions and firm values. However, there are only a few exceptions to examine how a managerial emotional bias (optimism, loss aversion and overconfidence) affects dividend policies. This stream of research contends whether to distribute dividends or not depends on how managers perceive of the company's future. We will use Bayesian network method to examine this relation. Emotional bias has been measured by means of a questionnaire comprising several items. As for the selected sample, it has been composed of some 100 Tunisian executives. Our results have revealed that leader affected by behavioral biases (optimism, loss aversion, and overconfidence) adjusts its dividend policy choices based on their ability to assess alternatives (optimism and overconfidence) and risk perception (loss aversion) to create of shareholder value and ensure its place at the head of the management team.

JEL Classification: G14, G31, G32, D80. Contribution/ OriginalityThe paper pushing organizations managers to choose according to their emotional level (applied emotional capacity test up psychometric testing). In addition, it increases the validity of inferences from the research. This paper incites governments to establish training programs aimed at the development of learning of emotional capacity.

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This article focuses on the impact of emotions on Tunisian chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. It examines specifically the role of executives' emotional intelligence (EI) level and their emotional biases, namely optimism in explaining compensation plans. An empirical study was conducted in this respect, by using a questionnaire as a method of data collection, on a sample of 100 Tunisian companies' leaders. This research paper translates an original approach, since it highlights the behavioral aspects role in explaining the CEO's compensation policy level. To the best of the knowledge, this represents the first study in the Tunisian context that explored this area of research. Actually, the results show that Tunisian leaders may be subject to certain emotions thereby impacting their compensation characteristics. Indeed, they opt at first to contribute to the organizational performance by establishing a mutual trust within the organizational structure in order to achieve the objectives already set up. However, this could be done at the expense of their compensation plans.