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In this paper, we make use of the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition to examine how the quality of budget institutions affects fiscal performance – primary balance and public debt – in sub‐Saharan Africa. To organise our approach, we categorise sub‐Saharan Africa countries according to the two main systems of budgetary institutions: the English‐based system and the French‐based system. The quality of budget institutions is measured through five criteria: centralisation, comprehensiveness, fiscal and procedural rules, sustainability and credibility, and transparency. Our findings show that, on average, Anglophone Africa countries have better budgetary institutions than their Francophone counterparts, and this difference is the main determinant of the fiscal performance gaps between the two groups. These performance gaps are mostly due to the characteristics effect, meaning that the relative poor fiscal performance of Francophone countries is not due to the French‐based system itself but rather to the environment in which it operates. The budget process and procedures in these countries are relatively less comprehensive, sustainable and transparent and that adversely affects their fiscal performance.

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We study the channels that theoretically transmit the effects of inequality to economic growth, unlike much of the existing literature that focuses on the direct linkage. The role of inequality in these transmission channels is difficult to pin down and varies with the particular inequality indicator chosen. We run our analyses with six methodologically distinct inequality measures (Gini coefficients and Top10 income shares). Methodological differences within the set of Gini coefficients and the Top10 income shares exert a first-order impact on the estimated relationships, which is generally larger than the effect of switching between Gini and Top10 income shares. For a given inequality indicator, we find that the transmission channels can react in opposite directions, with the net effect on growth difficult to determine. Finally, we emphasize two additional but so far underappreciated empirical complications: (i) estimated relationships change over time; and (ii) fragile countries create significant but counterintuitive empirical associations that may obscure structural relationships.