In this paper, we focus on verifiability of predicate encryption. A verifiable predicate encryption scheme guarantees that all legitimate receivers of a ciphertext will obtain the same message upon decryption. While verifiability of predicate encryption might be a desirable property by itself, we furthermore show that this property enables interesting applications.Specifically, we provide two applications of verifiable predicate encryption. Firstly, we show that for a large class of verifiable predicate encryption schemes, it is always possible to convert a chosen-plaintext secure scheme into a chosen-ciphertext secure one. Secondly, we show that a verifiable predicate encryption scheme allows the construction of a deniable predicate authentication scheme. This primitive enables a user to authenticate a message to a verifier using a private key satisfying a specified relation while at the same time allowing the user to deny ever having interacted with the verifier. This scheme furthermore guarantees the anonymity of the user in the sense that the verifier will learn nothing about the user's private key except that it satisfies the specified relation.Lastly, we show that many currently known predicate encryption schemes already provide verifiability, and furthermore demonstrate that many predicate encryption schemes which do not provide verifiability, can be easily converted into schemes providing verifiability.Our results not only highlight that verifiability is a very useful property of predicate encryption, but also show that efficient and practical schemes with this property can be obtained relatively easily.

In nanobiotechnology, the importance of controlling interactions between biological molecules and surfaces is paramount. In recent years, many devices based on nanostructured silicon materials have been presented, such as nanopores and nanochannels. However, there is still a clear lack of simple, reliable, and efficient protocols for preventing and controlling biomolecule adsorption in such structures. In this work, we show a simple method for passivation or selective biofunctionalization of silica, without the need for polymerization reactions or vapor-phase deposition. The surface is simply exposed stepwise to three different chemicals over the course of ∼1 h. First, the use of aminopropylsilatrane is used to create a monolayer of amines, yielding more uniform layers than conventional silanization protocols. Second, a cross-linker layer and click chemistry are used to make the surface reactive toward thiols. In the third step, thick and dense poly(ethylene glycol) brushes are prepared by a grafting-to approach. The modified surfaces are shown to be superior to existing options for silica modification, exhibiting ultralow fouling (a few ng/cm2) after exposure to crude serum. In addition, by including a fraction of biotinylated polymer end groups, the surface can be functionalized further. We show that avidin can be detected label-free from a serum solution with a selectivity (compared to nonspecific binding) of more than 98% without the need for a reference channel. Furthermore, we show that our method can passivate the interior of 150 nm × 100 nm nanochannels in silica, showing complete elimination of adsorption of a sticky fluorescent protein. Additionally, our method is shown to be compatible with modifications of solid-state nanopores in 20 nm thin silicon nitride membranes and reduces the noise in the ion current. We consider these findings highly important for the broad field of nanobiotechnology, and we believe that our method will be very useful for a great variety of surface-based sensors and analytical devices.

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In this paper, we propose a new theoretical security model for Shannon cipher systems under side-channel attacks, where the adversary is not only allowed to collect ciphertexts by eavesdropping the public communication channel but is also allowed to collect the physical information leaked by the devices where the cipher system is implemented on, such as running time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc. Our model is very robust as it does not depend on the kind of physical information leaked by the devices. We also prove that in the case of one-time pad encryption, we can strengthen the secrecy/security of the cipher system by using an appropriate affine encoder. More precisely, we prove that for any distribution of the secret keys and any measurement device used for collecting the physical information, we can derive an achievable rate region for reliability and security such that if we compress the ciphertext using an affine encoder with a rate within the achievable rate region, then: (1) anyone with a secret key will be able to decrypt and decode the ciphertext correctly, but (2) any adversary who obtains the ciphertext and also the side physical information will not be able to obtain any information about the hidden source as long as the leaked physical information is encoded with a rate within the rate region. We derive our result by adapting the framework of the one helper source coding problem posed and investigated by Ahlswede and Körner (1975) and Wyner (1975). For reliability and security, we obtain our result by combining the result of Csizár (1982) on universal coding for a single source using linear codes and the exponential strong converse theorem of Oohama (2015) for the one helper source coding problem.

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