Difficulty in financing and low financing efficiency is one of the bottlenecks that restrict the high-quality development of China’s energy-saving and environmental protection industry and economy. The key to improving financing efficiency is to understand its influencing factors. This paper uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist index to measure the overall financing efficiency and the efficiency of different financing methods of 205 Chinese energy-saving and environmental protection industries from 2015 to 2020 from static and dynamic perspectives, respectively, as well as the Tobit model to estimate the impact of factors such as the digital transformation and green technological innovation of enterprises on financing efficiency. The study shows the following: (1) Static analysis shows that: the financing efficiency of the comprehensive technical efficiency of China’s energy conservation and environmental protection industry is less than one, 5.8% to 23.41% of enterprises have very effective comprehensive technical financing efficiency, and fewer than 9% enterprises have very effective scale efficiency levels. Enterprises may have more room for improving their financing efficiency in the future. The four types of financing are, namely, internal financing, equity financing, fiscal financing, and debt financing, in descending order of efficiency. (2) Dynamic analysis shows that the financing efficiencies of debt financing and fiscal financing are both on an upward trend, while internal and equity financing efficiencies are on a downward trend. Additionally, the technological progress change index and scale efficiency are two key factors affecting the financing efficiency of different financing methods. (3) In terms of financing methods, the comprehensive technical efficiency and scale efficiency of endogenous financing and equity financing are high, while the comprehensive technical efficiency and scale efficiency of debt financing and fiscal financing are low and flat. (4) Digital transformation, green technology innovation, the asset–liability ratio, profitability, and operational capability have a significant positive impact on the financing efficiency of energy-saving and environmental protection enterprises. This paper studies the financing efficiency of China’s energy conservation and environmental protection industry under different financing methods and the mechanism through which key factors affect the financing efficiency of enterprises. It aims to provide a theoretical basis for managing financing methods scientifically and rationally and improving the financing efficiency of the energy conservation and environmental protection industry, as well as to provide practical reference for the implementation of digital transformation, green technology innovation and diversified financing in China and other developing economies.

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Green innovation is an important way for enterprises to achieve high-quality economic development, and it is also the way to achieve the goal of double carbon. Green innovation has therefore become a research hotspot. With the acceleration of the digitalization process in equipment enterprises, intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises located at the top of the industrial chain are in urgent need of green core technology innovation activities. In order to explore the internal mechanism of core green technology innovation, this research introduces reputation theory into the evolutionary game analysis process. By constructing an evolutionary game model between the government and intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises, this research analyzes the dynamic factors that affect the selection and evolution of the main strategies of the players in the evaluation game. The results show that corporate reputation, core green technology innovation profit, government subsidies, government reputation, and the cost for the government to support core technology, among other factors, importantly affect the game between the government and the enterprises. At the same time, since both the government and the enterprises are affected by the initial state and the maximization of the interests of both sides of the game, it is difficult for them to spontaneously reach an ideal stable and balanced state through a virtuous circle. The greater the profits and the reputation premium the core green technology innovation brings to the enterprises, the more favorable it is for the enterprises to choose core green technology innovation; government subsidies within a certain range will also drive enterprises to choose core green technology innovation. When the value of enterprise core green technology innovation is low, the cost for the government to support core green technology innovation is lower, enterprises will lose more opportunities and decline in global competitiveness, and it will become more favorable for the government to evolve towards supporting core green technology innovation. On the contrary, the government will gradually transfer its tangible hand to the intangible hand of the market based on the consideration of subsidies, innovation costs, and reputation. The results of this research are intended to provide a theoretical basis and practical reference for Chinese intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises to better achieve green core technology innovation.