No abstract

No abstract

Corporations and associations have outsourced meeting-planning functions to third-party planners, who are independent contractors. While the corporations and associations remain responsible for the meetings’ content, independent planners typically handle all other details, in particular, finding venues and negotiating contracts. Most of an independent planner’s business depends on a reputation for fair dealing, referrals, and continued relationships. Thus, the best planners are careful to ensure that all parties are aware of all contract provisions, including those for commissions. Planners also ensure that the hotels treat meeting clients fairly when not all rooms in the block are picked up and it is necessary to invoke attrition clauses.

PurposeThe aim of the paper is to help graduate students in the area of hospitality management to understand and deal with non‐performance charges and attrition issues.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses case studies to illustrate the issues that must be resolved.FindingsThere are many ways to look at issues – from the hotel's perspective, from the customer's viewpoint, and from an independent observer's position.Originality/valueThis training exercise highlights the complicated issues surrounding non‐performance charges and attrition issues, and suggests ways in which they can be fairly resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all parties to preserve goodwill all around.

Discusses previous research on the disincentive effects of some management performance measures on capital investment and the relationship between agency mechanisms (responsibility centre performance measures, tax incentives, compensation schemes and ownership influence) and investment behaviour. Uses a sample of US manufacturing firms in two industries to examine their investment behaviour from 1973‐1982 and relate it to the agency mechanisms applying to the investment decision makers. Finds the use of profit and net return on investment as management performance measures has a significant negative correlation with the investment; but that ownership influence and long‐term incentive compensation are positively related to it. Recognizes the limitations of the study and considers its implications for the use of performance measures, long‐term incentives and tax incentives.