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Competition assessment in Australia has traditionally been based on an evaluation of the market structure relying on five factors, namely the degree of market concentration, the height of barriers to entry, the extent of product differentiation, the extent of vertical integration, and the nature of arrangements between firms. These factors, known as the ‘QCMA factors’, are characteristic of competition in the manufacturing industries of the ‘old economy’. Since the ascendancy of Chicago and Post-Chicago School thinking competition analysis in Australia has also taken into consideration non-structural factors. However, in light of the dominance of big tech companies in online markets, the so-called ‘Neo-Brandeisian School’ has advocated focusing on structural elements that are characteristic of online markets. This article examines to what extent the QCMA factors still a suitable structural framework for the assessment of competition in online markets.

News media businesses compete with search engines and social media networks for advertising revenue but at the same time depend on the latter to reach and interact with audiences. The Digital Platforms Inquiry (DPI) completed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) found that media businesses’ dependency on digital platforms gives companies like Google and Facebook substantial bargaining power over Australian news media businesses. This development over the past decade has caused negative repercussions for the choice and quality of news available to Australians. In response to thegse findings, Australia’s News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code 2021 extends the application of competition law into digital news and advertising markets. The reform is intended to address the impact of digital platforms on the commercial viability of Australian news companies. In this article, we assess the application of competition law to the relationship between news media and digital platforms, including the strength of the DPI findings and the appropriateness of the resulting reforms. We argue that after decades of deregulation of the media sector in Australia the News Media Bargaining Code is a hybrid legislation, which introduces news media industry regulations under the guise of competition law. While we see a continued role for competition law in digital platform markets, this article indicates the challenges posed by digital platforms on media pluralism and the limitations of a market-driven approach to news media policy. news media businesses, digital platforms, advertising, regulation, media policy, Australian competition law, market power, media pluralism, Digital Platforms Inquiry, News Media Bargaining Code

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