The expanding pace of business competitiveness and increasing demand velocity for developing and deploying updated Operational and Security capabilities has created an environment where development and operations needed to work even closer together. The need was further enhanced due to the fact that all capabilities are being developed in a shared platform with no formal requirement processes, and no analysis of the overall enterprise capabilities and architecture. On the surface, the process lacks the usual discipline that most engineers are used to, but operationally it has the potential of bringing capabilities to operations at a quicker rate. The goal of providing continuously updated services should make sure that the overall enterprise performance and security posture are not compromised while the quick turnaround capability deployment is achieved. The proposed framework focuses on ensuring the continuity of strategic posturing while allowing maximum flexibility to tactical enhancements to meet emerging demands.

While the DoD has a strong identity and credential management foundation, much work remains to achieve the DoD access control vision of providing dynamic access control with appropriate granularity. Ongoing access control investments are transitioning from administrators manually provisioning of user accounts to Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) capabilities. While this offers significant operational benefits over manual provisioning, ABAC capabilities must evolve. A limiting factor of the ABAC method is its reliance on the availability of authoritative attributes, and the need for access control policies that focus on specific access requests and still result in desired enterprise-wide operations. In today's DoD mission and business environments, there is a compelling need to provide authorized users, both anticipated and unanticipated, access to sensitive and classified enterprise information and the resources they need, when and where they need it, while preventing disclosure or exploitation by malicious insiders and other adversaries access to the same information. To meet this challenge, a DoD-wide Dynamic Access Management capability is needed by combining ABAC with risk management to achieve Risk Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC).1.0 INTRODUCTION To control access to computer systems and networks, and the information and services they provide, system administrators are required to provision accounts to users for systems they access. Much of this is done manually and access attributes are hardcoded per user. Unfortunately the access control mechanisms in place today are no longer sufficient to meet the changing needs of the DoD. As we continue to realize the importance of information to the successful execution of our missions, it is critical that the DoD enhance its access control posture to achieve more dynamic and fine-grained capabilities necessary to protect and ensure the availability of our valuable information assets to the people that need it. [4] Operational realities and Information Assurance (IA) requirements that must be addressed in providing a Dynamic Access Management capability include:• Providing dynamic access to enterprise information to people with the appropriate attributes (clearance, citizenship, and organizational membership) while prohibiting access to enterprise information by people and resources that do not meet the access criteria. This fine-grained access control is fundamental to preventing unauthorized disclosure of classified as well as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). • Growing population of users with increased diversity (nationality, organizational affiliation, operational roles, and security clearances).

Many of the benefits of an Internet of Things sensor network model stem from the extremely long service life of its base sensing layer. When data from the base sensing layer is provided by very low power technologies, such as Bluetooth Low Energy, a class of vulnerabilities called Denial of Sleep attacks can be especially devastating to the network. These attacks can reduce the lifespan of the sensing nodes by several orders of magnitude, rendering the network largely unusable. This paper investigates a Denial of Sleep attack against the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol that allows a malicious actor to rapidly drain the battery of a targeted sensing node, including power analysis, simulation results, and an example implementation. The outcome will be utilized to build better defenses and more predictable environments.

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