Summaryobjective To measure costs and willingness-to-pay for delivery care services in 8 districts of Nepal. method Household costs were used to estimate total resource requirements to finance: (1) the current pattern of service use; (2) all women to deliver in a health facility; (3) skilled attendance at home deliveries with timely referral of complicated cases to a facility offering comprehensive obstetric services.results The average cost to a household of a home delivery ranged from 410 RS ($5.43) (with a friend or relative attending) to 879 RS ($11.63) (with a health worker). At a facility the average fee for a normal delivery was 678 RS ($8.97). When additional charges, opportunity and transport costs were added, the total amount paid exceeded 5300 RS ($70). For a caesarean section the total household cost was more than 11 400 RS ($150). Based on these figures, the cost of financing current practice is 45 RS ($0.60) per capita. A policy of universal institutional delivery would cost 238 RS ($3.15) per capita while a policy of skilled attendance at home with early referral of cases from remote areas would cost around 117 RS ($1.55) per capita. These are significant sums in the context of a health budget of about 400 RS ($5) per capita.conclusions The financial cost of developing a skilled attendance strategy in Nepal is substantial. The mechanisms to direct funding to women in need must to be improved, pricing needs to be more transparent, and payment exemptions in public facilities must be better financed if we are to overcome both supply and demand-side barriers to care seeking.

BackgroundNepal's Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) was introduced nationwide in 2005 with the intention of increasing utilisation of professional care at childbirth. It provided cash to women giving birth in a health facility and an incentive to the health provider for each delivery attended, either at home or in the facility. We explored early implementation of the programme at the district-level to understand the factors that have contributed to its low uptake.MethodsWe conducted in ten study districts a series of key informant interviews and focus group discussions with staff from health facilities and the district health office and other stakeholders involved in implementation. Manual content analysis was used to categorise data under emerging themes.ResultsProblems at the central level imposed severe constraints on the ability of district-level actors to implement the programme. These included bureaucratic delays in the disbursement of funds, difficulties in communicating the policy, both to implementers and the wider public and the complexity of the programme's design. However, some district implementers were able to cope with these problems, providing reasons for why uptake of the programme varied considerably between districts. Actions appeared to be influenced by the pressure to meet local needs, as well individual perceptions and acceptance of the programme. The experience also sheds light on some of the adverse effects of the programme on the wider health system.ConclusionThe success of conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America has led to a wave of enthusiasm for their adoption in other parts of the world. However, context matters and proponents of similar programmes in south Asia should give due attention to the challenges to implementation when capacity is weak and health services inadequate.