Based on the Paris Agreement's principle of institutional arrangement for independent contributions to reduce CO2 emissions, we divided the Paris Agreement Parties into developed and developing countries as a game between the two sides. Under the assumption of limited rationality, the selection strategies of both sides are divided into three categories: strict adherence, partial compliance, and non-compliance. Using evolutionary game theory and methods to analyze the game strategies chosen by both sides, and using simulation methods to verify the scenarios under different parameters, the game subjects both strictly adhere to the carbon reduction agreement and do not perform the optimal strategy choice. We find that the developed countries' strict adherence to carbon reduction commitments has a very significant positive impact on carbon reduction in other countries. Therefore, we propose that it is a prerequisite for the developed countries to strictly adhere to the treaty obligations, which is the prerequisite for the implementation of the global carbon reduction target, and the developing countries' strict adherence to the treaty obligations is the key to realizing the goal. Moreover, we suggest that the international community should strengthen the supervision and implementation of the Paris Agreement, and provide more support and assistance to developing countries to ensure the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement.