We examine whether "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) factors affect estimates of scale economies for large banks. From a standard model of bank production that does not control for any TBTF factors, we find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks. We then control for TBTF factors by using a measure of the "implicit subsidy" that emerges from a reduction in TBTF banks' funding costs due to investor expectations of government support. We do this in two ways: first, we estimate scale economies from an augmented model of bank production that employs a proxy for the counterfactual price of debt that banks would face in the absence of any TBTF funding cost advantage; second, we estimate scale economies from a model of bank production that is estimated only for a sample of banks considered unlikely to be TBTF. After controlling for TBTF factors using either method, we no longer find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks. These results suggest that estimated scale economies for large banks are affected by TBTF factors.JEL codes: G21, L11, L25

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Around 10% of European firms were in receipt of subsidized bank loans following the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011. To what extent did such forbearance lending contribute to the subsequent low output growth experienced by the euro area? In this paper, we address this question by developing a quantitative model of firm dynamics in which forbearance lending and firm defaults arise endogenously. The model provides a close approximation to key euro-area firm statistics over the period 2011 to 2014. We evaluate the impact of forbearance lending by considering a counterfactual scenario in which firms no longer have access to loan forbearance. Our key finding is that aggregate output, investment and total factor productivity are higher in the absence of forbearance lending than in the benchmark scenario that includes forbearance lending. This suggests that forbearance lending practices contributed to the low output growth across the euro area following the onset of the sovereign debt crisis.The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Bank of England or its committees. I would like to acknowledge the use of the University of Oxford Advanced Research Computing facility in carrying out this work. http://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22558. I wish to thank Wouter Den Haan,

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