Although New Zealand is a member of the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence community, it has taken a relatively cautious and in recent years often deliberative approach to counterterrorism powers, including in relation to access to encrypted communications. That approach can be seen to reflect New Zealand’s security, legal and political context and in particular its tendencies to independence, pragmatism and support for human rights. It is also apparent in the responses to date to the deaths of 51 people in the March 2019 attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand and, in particular, in the Christchurch Call, an initiative against terrorist and violent extremist content online. The Call is a non-binding standard adopted in cooperation with numerous other governments and large online service providers and includes commitments to transparency and human rights. As Five Eyes countries’ individual and collective positions concerning access to encrypted communications become increasingly forceful, the question is whether New Zealand will follow those positions or pursue more principled, collaborative and likely more workable measures, in line with its wider approach and the example of the Call.

When the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was reached between the UK and the EU on 24 December 2020, it gave extradition practitioners only a few days to identify what, if anything, would remain from the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system before it came into force on 1 January 2021. The article starts by setting out how the EAW was implemented in the UK prior to 1 January 2021, before turning to the TCA itself and what it means for extradition or ‘surrender’ between EU member states and the UK. In short, the EAW system no longer applies. The authors set out how the TCA provides a degree of continuity, now under the watchful eye of the UK–EU ‘Specialised Committee on Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation’. There are notable departures from the EAW system however, in both practical and legal terms, that open the door to increased scrutiny of extradition requests. The authors explore the impact these changes may have on the future of extradition with the EU27, to or from the UK.

This article provides an analysis of the new provisions in the EUUK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) that govern Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal matters. While only few provisions of the European Investigation Order are picked up by the TCA, it is mostly based on the Council of Europe’s European Mutual Assistance Convention of 1959. An overview on applicable law is provided, after which a closer look is taken at procedural aspects in general as well as specific differences between previously applicable and new provisions. In this respect, two conditions for issuing a request are considered, namely availability in similar domestic cases and proportionality. Grounds for refusal, provisional measures and legal remedies also are highlighted. The authors conclude that the new provisions leave a lot of unanswered questions and that while mutual legal assistance can continue, it will happen at reduced pace.

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