No abstract

This paper argues that energy systems are becoming increasingly complex, and illustrates how new types of hazards emerge from an ongoing transition towards renewable energy sources. It shows that the energy sector relies heavily on risk assessment methods that are analytic, and that systemic methods provide important additional insights. A case study of the Dutch gas sector illustrates this by comparing the hazard and operability study (HAZOP, analytic) with the system-theoretic process analysis (STPA, systemic). The contribution is twofold. This paper illustrates how system hazards will remain underestimated by sustained use of only analytic methods, and it highlights the need to study the organization of safety in energy transitions. We conclude that appropriate risk assessment for future energy systems involves both analytic and systemic risk assessments.

Countries with extensive gas infrastructures are increasingly turning towards gasses that are produced from renewable energy sources, such as biomass, solar and wind. While these renewable gasses such as biogas/green gas and possibly hydrogen are compatible with existing infrastructure, they exhibit different combustion and explosion behavior. Current safety practices designed for natural gas are not sufficient to ensure a similar level of safety, and must be updated to mitigate changing risks. Additionally, new actors are emerging who are involved with the production and distribution process. The current paper analyzes the extent to which the gas sector in the Netherlands is equipped to deal with a changing risk profile by elaborating on two risk analysis methods. These methods are applied to a segment of the green gas. We find that the Bowtie method that is currently used in the sector provides an understanding of the physical and technical aspects of risks related to green gas provision and is instrumental in communicating them to a general audience. It is also, however, largely static and does nog accommodate changing technical and institutional features of gas provision. The System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model, conversely, provides better tools to understand the interaction between incumbent and new actors and technology in the gas sector and provides comprehensive design recommendations for renewable gas systems to a specific audience.